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I. INTRODUCTION
America is spending nearly a trillion dollars annually on health
care.' Although neither state nor national legislators can agree on the
details, the focus of health care reform has been the "managed com-
petition" model. Managed competition intends to control health care
costs by encouraging price competition among health care providers.2
In a typical managed competition plan, such as that recently enacted
in the state of Florida, a state agency negotiates on behalf of many
purchasers in order to demand lower prices from providers.' Managed
competition, therefore, attempts to lower costs by managing demand.
Supply, and not demand, was the emphasis of early health care reg-
ulation.4 "Certificate of need" (CON) laws were designed to keep
health care costs low by requiring advance approval by state agencies
for most hospital expansions and major equipment purchases., Con-
gress required all states to pass CON laws in 1974, but quickly re-
pealed that requirement after finding it ineffective for controlling
health care costs.6
Today, thirty-eight states retain CON laws.' Many of these same
states have passed managed competition laws.' This Comment will
1. Clark C. Havighurst, Contract Failure in the Market for Health Services, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 47, 47 (1994) [hereinafter Havighurst, Contract Failure in Health Care].
2. Commentators identify a definite trend toward the adoption of the managed competi-
tion health care strategy:
Managed competition is the theory underlying not only President Clinton's health care
reform proposal, but also the leading alternative plans proposed by conservative Dem-
ocrats and moderate Republicans. Additionally, managed competition is being pur-
sued in many states and by many private employers, and has been advanced as the
fundamental basis for health care reform by private interest groups as diverse as hos-
pitals, doctors, labor unions, and businesses. Therefore, it is no longer necessary to
speculate whether managed competition in some form will be adopted.
Mark A. Hall, Managed Competition and Integrated Health Care Delivery Systems, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 1, 2 (1994); see also Dennis A. Yap et al., Antitrust and Managed Competition
for Health Care, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 301, 301 (1994).
3. See FLA. STAT. § 408.70(2) (1993). Florida's Agency for Health Care Administration
acknowledges that Florida's version of managed competition differs significantly from Professor
Enthoven's original model of managed competition. See infra part IV.B.
4. See Clark C. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by "Certificate of
Need," 59 VA. L. REv. 1143, 1148-51 (1973) [hereinafter Havighurst, Regulation by CON].
5. See infra part II.B.I and statutes cited infra note 14.
6. See infra part I.B.2 and statute cited infra note 45.
7. Certificate of need laws are in place in Alabama, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Del-
aware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, the Virgin Islands, Washington, and West Virginia. See
infra note 14.
8. See Hall, supra note 2. at 2. See also Janice Somerville, States Pave Way on Managed
Competition, AM. MED. NEws, March 15, 1993, at 1.
1995]
144 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 23:141
explore the role of CON laws in a state with a managed competition
system. 9 Part II traces the origin and intent of CON, noting that CON
has historically failed to achieve its intended policy goals.' 0 Part III
summarizes the origin and implementation of a managed competition
health care strategy, illustrating that strong evidence demonstrates
that managed competition can lower health care costs." Part IV shows
that managed competition invalidates the presumptions underlying the
alleged need for CON. 12 Part V focuses on Florida, where the conflict
between CON and managed competition is becoming reality, and
urges Florida and similarly situated states either to scale back CON or
accept the failure of managed competition that CON will inevitably
cause. 3
II. ORIGIN AND INTENT OF CERTIFICATE OF NEED REGULATIONS
Certificate of need is the common name for a diverse group of state
health care laws attempting to control health care costs by regulating
supply. 4 These laws require that a permit, usually called a certificate
of need, be issued by a state health planning agency before a health
care facility may construct or expand, offer a new service, or purchase
equipment exceeding a certain cost. 5 A CON will not be issued unless
9. Hospital licensing, budgeting, physician and antitrust issues are beyond the scope of
this Comment.
10. See infra pp. 144-61.
11. See infra pp. 161-67.
12. See infra pp. 167-75.
13. See infra pp. 175-88.
14. E.g., CODE OF A.ABAMA §§ 22-21-260 to 278 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.07.021-.111
(1995); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 437.10, 439.7 (1995); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 15438.1
(1994); CONN. GEs. STAT. §§ 19a-154 to 155 (1994) (licensing and budget review law); 16 DEL.
CODE ANN. §§ 9301-11 (1994); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-326 (1981); FLA. STAT. ch. 408 (1993 and
Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-1 to 70 (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 323D-1 to 54 (1989);
IND. CODE ANN. 6§ 16-29-1-1 to 16 (Burns 1994) (expiring July 1, 1996 pursuant to IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-29-1-16); IOWA CODE §§ 135.621-.73 (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-4802 to 4822
(1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 216B.010-.310 (Baldwin 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§
301-24 (1994); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN., §§ 19-101 to 222 (1994); MIcH. COMP. LAWS §§
333.22201-60 (1995); Miss. CODE §§ 41-7-171 to 209 (1995); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 197.30-65
(1995); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-5-301 to 316 (1994); NEa. REV. STAT. §§ 71-5801 to 70 (1994);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 151-C:1 to 15 (1994); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 26:2H-1 to 21-39 (1994);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131E-175 to 190 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-17.2-01 to 15 (1993); Osno
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3702.51-.60 (Anderson 1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 1-850 to 858 (1995);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 442.58-.86 (1992); 35 PA. CONS+. STAT. §§ 448.701-.712 (1995) (expiring 1996);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-7-320 to 460 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-11-101 to 125
(1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 9431-44 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-102.1 to 102.11 (Mi-
chic 1994); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 223 (1994); WASH. REV. COD §§ 70.38.015-.920 (1995);
W. VA. CODE §§ 16-2D-1 to 15 (1995).
15. 41 C.J.S. Hfospitals § 4 (1991).
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a new facility or service is genuinely needed in a given community.' 6
Although determining need can be problematic,' 7 CON laws provide
statutory and rule criteria to guide the issuing agency's discretion. 8
A. State Origins
CON laws originated from local community efforts to allocate phil-
anthropic and federal funding so that new hospitals would be built
where they were most needed. 9 Throughout the Great Depression and
World War II, few new hospitals were built in the United States, yet
many existing hospitals became obsolete. 20 The ensuing crisis was ex-
acerbated by an inadequate distribution of hospitals among and
within the states.' In response, community fund-raising and charita-
ble activities of the 1940's evolved into organized community plans
for hospital development.2 2 Community planning became particularly
important in 1946 with the passage of the federal Hill-Burton Act.
21
Hill-Burton provided federal subsidies for hospital construction, and
promoted local planning in order to identify local needs. 24 The local
planners in some communities worked under nongovernmental auspi-
ces, while planners in other communities worked as part of govern-
mental health planning agencies. 25 For those communities without
16. Community Hosp. of New Port Richey/Univ. Psychiatric Ctr. v. Department of HRS,
520 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
17. See, e.g., Ronald A. Case, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute Requiring
Establishment of "Need" as Precondition to Operation of Hospital or Other Facilities for the
Care of Sick People, 61 A.L.R. 3d 278 (1994) (summarizing the various ways states have defined
and interpreted the requirement of "need"). "[The very notion of need has been rendered syste-
matically opaque and ambiguous .... [T]he meaning of need has increasingly been drained of
substantive meaning." Daniel Callahan, Transforming Mortality: Technology and Resource Al-
location, 65 S. CAL. L. Rv. 205 (1991). But see Carl J. Schramm & Steven C. Renn, Hospital
Mergers, Market Concentration and the HerfindahI-Hirschman Index, 33 EMORY L.J. 869, 881
n.30 (1984) ("[H]istorically, demonstrating 'need' has often been an easy task, and less than
one-quarter of all proposed projects fail to win planning agency approval."). The Supreme
Court has held that "need" is not an unconstitutionally vague standard in regulatory statutes.
See, e.g., Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933).
18. E.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 408 (1993); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. rr. 59C-1.001-.050 (1995).
19. See Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1148.
20. S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Congress, 2d Sess. 39 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7842, 7859 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 1285].
21. Id.
22. See Maja Campbell-Eaton, Note, Antitrust and Certificate of Need: A Doubtful Prog-
nosis, 69 IOWA L. Rav. 1451, 1453 (1984).
23. Hospital Survey & Constr. (Hill-Burton) Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040
(1946) (codified in sections of 24, 42 U.S.C.).
24. Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1150.
25. See id. at 1149.
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government-enforced health planning agencies, local plans were vol-
untary.2 6
Over time, voluntary planning waned, while compulsory, govern-
ment-enforced planning flourished. 27 This was not necessarily the re-
sult of the Hill-Burton Act, because eighty-seven percent of the total
funds required for voluntary hospital construction from 1946 to 1967
came from private fund-raising sources." One explanation for why
voluntary planning declined is the benefit that the hospitals received
from mandatory regulation. 29 Mandatory regulation through health
planning agencies helped identify the most urgent health needs, helped
meet these needs through cooperative and consensual development,
and helped curb the excessive cost increases and price decreases often
caused by a competitive marketplace.30
Hospitals regulated by a health planning agency can collectively de-
termine the size of a community's hospital bed supply, and thereby
engage in output restriction.' Regulated hospitals can also collectively
allocate areas of responsibility both geographically and by activity,
and thereby engage in market division.2
These two activities-output restriction and market division-are
classic characteristics of a cartel.3 In fact, many of the output restric-
tion and market division activities of early health planning agencies
were indistinguishable from the activities of a cartel.3 4 Critics fre-
quently observe that "regulatory agencies tend to adopt strategies dis-
turbingly similar to those which an industry-wide cartel ... would
pursue if it could." 35 In any cartel, centralized planning and sanctions
26. See id.
27. Seeid.at 1150.
28. Id. at 1150 & n.24 (citing Kotelchuch, How To Build a Hospital, HEA.TH-PAC BUt.,
May 1972, at 1).
29. See id. at 1149-50.
30. Id. at 1149.
31. See id. at 1149 & n.21 (citing, inter alia, D. Brown, The Process of Areawide Health
Planning: Model for the Future?, I IMED. CARE 1, 3 (1973)).
32. See id.
33. Id. at 1149.
34. [H]ealth planning agencies have also served to ... curb competitive excesses.
Indeed, many of the activities undertaken in the name of planning were indistinguish-
able from such typical cartel practices as output restriction (collective determination of
the bed supply) and market division (allocation of areas of responsibility both geo-
graphically and by activity). The cartel characterization ... in some industry settings
[is] quite useful in preventing unnecessary duplication of facilities and other wasteful
side effects of competition.
Id. For a simple and practical introduction to the use and benefits of a cartel, see AviNAsH Dtxrr
& BARRY NALEBUFF, TnNKING STRATEGICALLY: THE CoMPETTrIvE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS,
AND EVERYDAY LFE 225-27 (1991).
35. Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1183 (citing Jordan, Producer Protec-
tion, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J.L. & ECON. 151
(1972)).
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against uncooperative members are essential if the participants are to
avoid the effects of a competitive market. 6 The early mandatory
health planning agencies provided the necessary planning and sanc-
tions, and did so with the aid and permission of local governments. 7
Hospitals have successfully organized to support and proliferate
state CON laws. In 1964, New York became the first state to pass a
statute of statewide effect38 that required a governmental determina-
tion of need before any hospital or nursing home was constructed. 9
Just four years later, the American Hospital Association indicated its
membership's acceptance of CON laws. 0 The American Hospital As-
sociation then began nationwide lobbying efforts to pass CON laws at
the state level, 4' and even drafted a model state law. 42 By 1975, twenty
states-enacted CON laws. 43 By 1978, thirty-six states had enacted such
laws."
B. Congressional Origins
After 1978, almost all states enacted CON laws, primarily because
the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of
36. Id. at 1150.
37. Self-enforcing cartels are difficult to arrange. Cartels are far more effective if an out-
sider enforces the collective agreement limiting competition. Laws often serve as the outside
enforcer. DIXIT & NALEaSJFF, supra note 34, at 227 (describing how banning cigarette advertising
from television helped cigarette company cartels "avoid mutually damaging and costly advertis-
ing campaigns and thus improved their profits").
38. Metcalf-McCloskey Act of 1964 (codified in N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 730 (McKinney
1971)).
39. Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1151.
40. Id.
41. See id. (citing AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
CERTIFICATION OF NEED FOR HEALTH CARE FACrITIEs AND SERVICES (1972)). "[T]he American
Hospital Association [was] a key supporter in the movement for state certificate-of-need legisla-
tion." Randall Bovbjerg, Problems and Prospects for Health Planning: The Importance of In-
centives, Standards, and Procedures in Certificate of Need, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 83, 88. "Before
the American Hospital Association indicated its acceptance of the certificate-of-need approach
in 1968, only New York had a certificate-of-need law; legislation by other states followed that
acceptance." Id. at 88 n.22 (emphasis added).
42. Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1151 (citing American Hospital Asso-
ciation, Suggested Model Legislation for Implementation of State Certification of Need, Nov.-
15, 1972 (mimeo., draft)).
43. Mark E. Kaplan, Comment, An Economic Analysis of Florida's Hospital Certificate of
Need Program and Recommendations for Change, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 475, 478 (1991).
44. James F. Blumstein and Frank A. Sloan, Health Planning and Regulation Through
Certificate of Need: An Overview, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 3, 3 n.l (citing DIVISION OF REGULATORY
ACTIVITIES, BUREAU OF HEALTH PLANNING AND RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, STATUS OF CERTIFICATE OF NEED AND SECTION 1122 PROGRAMS IN THE
STATES (1978)).
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197441 provided substantial federal funding for state and local health
planning activities." Under the 1974 National Health Act, 4" certain
federal health care funds were conditioned on the state's enactment of
CON laws .4  By 1986, forty-two states plus the District of Columbia
had responded to Congressional pressure by enacting a CON pro-
gram. 49 After 1986, however, Congress turned full circle, repealing the
1974 National Health Act and its requirement for state CON laws.5 0
The reason for Congress' abandonment of CON is simple: the laws
are counterproductive for reforming health care.
1. Why Congress Promoted Certificate of Need: The Legislative
History
CON laws were expected to add "teeth" to the 1974 National
Health Act.5 Under the Act, Congress intended CON to achieve three
health care goals. First and foremost, CON was to restrain skyrocket-
ing health care costs." Second, CON was to prevent the unnecessary
duplication of health resources." Third and most ambitiously, CON
was to achieve equal access to quality health care at a reasonable
cost.5 4 The legislative history of the National Health Act clearly enun-
ciates these goals, yet does not clearly illuminate the social and eco-
nomic situation which made these goals appear acceptable and
necessary. The following addresses each of these legislative goals sepa-
rately, supplementing each with information gathered from legal
sources published at the time the Act was passed, or published after
45. Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300k-300n-6 (1982)),
amended by Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-79, §§ 1-129, 93 Stat. 592 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (1976 & Supp. V 1981), re-
pealed by Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 701, 100 Stat. 3743, 3799 (1986).
46. Scott D. Makar, Antitrust Immunity Under Florida's Certificate of Need Program, 19
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 149, 150(1991).
47. In using the term "1972 National Health Act," this Comment refers to the National
Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 and also to the interpretive federal
regulations authorized by section 300n-l(c) of that Act. E.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 4,002 (1977) (index);
id. at 4,017-18 (explanatory comments); id. at 4,027 (formerly codified in 42 C.F.R. §§ 122.308-
.309 (1977)); id. at 4,031 (formerly codified in 42 C.F.R. § 123.409 (1977)).
48. Kaplan, supra note 43, at 478. For a discussion of the requirements under the Act, see
generally Peter P. Budetti, Public Policy Issues Surrounding Certificate of Need, 1978 UTAH L.
REv. 39.
49. Kaplan, supra note 43, at 478.
50. See generally James B. Simpson, Full Circle: The Return of Certificate of Need Regula-
tion of Health Facilities to State Control, 19 INsD. L. REv. 1025 (1986).
51. Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1153.
52. S. RaP. No. 96, 96th Congress, 1st Sess. 42, reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1306,
1347.
53. Id. at 1310.
54. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 300k(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
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the Act with the intent of analyzing the Act's purpose. Through such
an analysis, Congress's "three" reasons for CON are revealed to be
just a single purpose: to reduce the aggregate cost of the nation's
health care.
a. Restraining Skyrocketing Health Care Costs
The primary Congressional purpose in requiring CON laws was to
save money. 5 Statistics compiled prior to the passage of the 1974 Act
reveal the severity of the 1970s' health care crisis. For example, when
Congress considered the National Health Act, medical care prices
were rising at an annual rate of 16.6 percent,5 6 hospital charges were
rising at an annual rate of 18.7 percent,517 yet the consumer price index
was rising at a considerably lower annual rate of 13.7 percent.58 The
average cost of a single day in the hospital rose from nearly $16.00 in
1950, to almost $45.00 in 1965, and then to about $128.00 in 1974.19
These figures show an alarming rate of increase in health care costs.
At the time of the 1974 Act, as now, health care costs were out of
control. 6o
b. Preventing the Unnecessary Duplication of Health Resources
The drafters of the 1974 National Health Act viewed the underutili-
zation of health care resources as a primary cause of skyrocketing.
health care costs. 6' The 1974 National Health Act was "premised on
the theory that the current structure and incentives of the health care
industry lead to overinvestment and that unneeded ... health care
resources contribute significantly to rampant inflation in health care
costs.' '62
55. See Bovbjerg, supra note 41, at 84.
56. S. REP. No. 1285, supra note 20, at 55.
57. See Bovbjerg, supra note 41, at 84.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Contra Havighurst, Contract Failure in Health Care, supra note 1, at 47 (arguing that
health care costs never were, and are not now, excessive). Critics of certificate of need do not
contend that health care costs are not a nationwide crisis. But see Bovbjerg, supra note 41, at 84
(contending that the continually rising cost of health care is not a crisis, but an economic situa-
tion no less troubling than the continually rising cost of cellular phones). CON's critics differ
from their proponents in their beliefs about the cause of the health care crisis. E.g., id. (blaming
the cost of health care on a failure of contract law); A. J. G. Priest, Possible Adaptation of
Public Utility Concepts in the Health Care Field, 35 LAw & CONTEMs. PROaS. 839 (1970) (advo-
cating regulation such as that of natural monopolies). Congress believed that the cause of the
health care crisis was largely because the health care marketplace lacked adequate incentives for
cost containment. S. Rap. No. 1285, supra note 20.
61. Bovbjerg, supra note 41, at 83.
62. Id.
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The Senate committee drafting the 1974 National Health Act found
that the need for additional hospital beds63 in the nation had virtually
disappeared." As of 1974, 20,000 beds nationwide were underutilized
to the point of being labeled "surplus," and the number of surplus
beds was expected to exceed 67,000 by 1975.6 Accordingly, the Act
sought to remedy the "maldistribution of health care facilities and
manpower."66
Congress adhered to the theory that the cost of excess supply was
ultimately borne by third party purchasers, and then passed on to
health care consumers in the form of higher premiums and cost for
services. 67 According to Congress's theory, third party fee-for-service
insurance agreements encourage providers to overindulge in capital in-
vestments. 68 Companies operating in a traditionally competitive mar-
ket do not overindulge in capital investments because service and
facility expansion benefits a company only if demand exceeds supply,
or if efficiencies can be realized through economies of scale.69 In Con-
gress's theory, however, health care facilities do not respond to these
typical pressures of a competitive market. Proponents of CON cite
four reasons why health care facilities have the propensity to overin-
vest in capital investments: the externalization of purchase costs, the
nonprice competition among providers, the physicians' effect on sup-
ply, and the "Roemer Effect" on demand.70
i. The Externalization of Purchase Costs
In the health care climate that created the 1974 Act, third party fee-
for-service insurance agreements, such as those traditionally provided
by Blue Cross/Blue Shield and the federal Medicare and Medicaid
health insurance programs, were the dominant means of health care
63. In order to discuss available patient services most accurately, without regard to the type
and size of the health care facility, health care planners identify services by referring to the
number of beds available for patient usage.
64. S. REP. No. 1285, supra note 20.
65. Id.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 300k(a)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
67. See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 44, at 4-5 ("[Tlhird-party payment .. provides few
incentives for either the hospital or the physician to achieve greater efficiency, and inexorably
leads to higher overall consumer costs.").
68. Bovbjerg. supra note 41, at 85; Campbell-Eaton, supra note 22, at 1458.
69. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, DEREGULATING THE H.ALTH CARE INDUSTRY-PLANNING
FOR COMPETITION 54 (1982) [hereinafter 1AVIGHURST, DEREGULATING FOR COMPETITION].
70. No source actually cites to all four of these reasons. The author compiled this list him-
self, gathering information from a variety of sources. See generally Blumstein & Sloan supra
note 44; Bovbjerg, supra note 41; Campbell-Eaton, supra note 22; Havighurst, Contract Failure
in Health Care, supra note 1; HAVbOHURST, DEREGULATION FOR COMPETITION, supra note 69;
Kaplan, supra note 43; Simpson, supra note 50; Makar, supra note 46; Budetti, supra note 48.
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financing." Third party fee-for-service insurance agreements, or "fee-
for-service," reimburse health care providers retrospectively for the
costs of services rendered to insured patients. 72 In other words, fee-
for-service agreements do not negotiate medical fees in advance, but
instead negotiate payment after services are rendered and prices are
set. Fee-for-service reimbursement rates typically include "overhead,"
such as the operating costs and capital expenditures of health care
providers. 73 Congress believed that the overhead payments, although
initially made by the third party insurer, are ultimately borne by the
public through higher taxes due to Medicare/Medicaid 74 or through
higher premiums charged by commercial insurers. 75 Health care facili-
ties are therefore allegedly insufficiently deterred from unnecessary
construction, 76 because costs are passed to the consumer in the form
of higher fees. As a result, fee-for-service allegedly allows health care
entities to overinvest in new facilities and equipment with diminished
regard for public need or efficiency. 77
Therefore, fee-for-service allegedly reduces the financial risks of ex-
cess capacity and overinvestment because health care providers di-
rectly recoup their investment costs. 78 However, this contention
overlooks the monitoring effects of section 1122 review. The 1974 Na-
tional Health Act's CON program was modeled after the earlier, and
coexisting, section 1122 capital expenditure review provisions79 of the
Social Security Amendments of 1972.80 Even after Congress mandated
the passage of state CON laws, Medicare and Medicaid section 1122
reviews were allowing states to review capital expenditures and to
deny reimbursement for expenditures which did not fit the state's
71. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 44, at 4-5.
72. Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1157.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Because neither providers nor patients directly face medical costs under the
system, only the insurers have the incentive to control costs. Even this incentive is
reduced, however, due to the insurer's ability to disperse costs widely among the in-
sured population, thereby reflecting cost increases only by increased insurance prem-
iums.
Campbell-Eaton, supra note 22, at 1458. See also, Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note
4, at 1157, 1159-60.
76. Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1158; Campbell-Eaton, supra note
22, at 1458-59.
77. Campbell-Eaton, supra note 22, at 1458.
78. Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1157-58; Campbell-Eaton, supra note
22, at 1458; see HAVITHURST, DEREGULATING FOR COMPETITION, supra note 69, at 54.
79. Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1153-55.
80. Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-l
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
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health plan.8 Section 1122 programs allow states, on a voluntary ba-
sis, to participate in reviewing capital expenditures made by health
care facilities receiving federal funds under the Medicare and Medi-
caid subchapters 82 of the Social Security Act.83 State planning agencies
perform the section 1122 reviews, and may deny federal reimburse-
ment for amounts attributable to depreciation, interest on borrowed
funds, and return on equity capital if the agency finds that a health
care facility's capital expenditure does not further state health plan-
ning needs.8 Section 1122 review programs therefore sought the same
result as CON laws by empowering state agencies to curb health care
facility growth and expenditures by requiring conformance with a
state health care plan. Stated somewhat differently, section 1122 and
CON both seek the same goals using the same methods.
With 20/20 hindsight, it appears Congress was unwise in believing
that CON would succeed in adequately controlling health care costs
when the section 1122 review programs did not succeed. According to
the legislative history, Congress was aware that CON laws achieved a
purpose nearly identical to section 1122 review, and achieved this pur-
pose by nearly identical means.85 Recognizing this, a House of Repre-
sentatives committee recommended amending the Senate bill so that
CON laws would be required only in states which did not voluntarily
engage in section 1122 review programs. 86 However, in a Conference
Committee, a substitute bill was drafted omitting the House Commit-
tee's recommended amendment. 1 Thus, even in states already control-
ling capital expenditures under section 1122 review programs, CON
laws were required88 under the 1974 National Health Act.8 9
81. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1640, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7971, 7985. The Senate bill creating the 1974 National Health Act "specifies that
a certificate-of-need program is required if the State Agency serves as the designated planning
agency under section 1122." Id.
82. Chapters XVIII and XIX, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-1 (Supp. V 1981).
83. Campbell-Eaton, supra note 22, at 1455 n.35.
84. Id.
85. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1640, supra note 81, at 7985.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 7986.
88. Although termed "requirements," the CON provisions by themselves . . .
create powerful incentives ... by conditioning the receipt of large amounts of federal
funds on . . . enter[ing] into a "designation agreement" ..... [A] state [certificate of
need] program is a mandatory requirement for entering into a designation agreement
.... The designation agreement entails federal authorization of a state health plan-
ning and development agency (SHPDA). The SHPDA then may receive funds for the
administration of the state CON program.
Campbell-Eaton, supra note 22, at 1455-56 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). In practical
effect, certificate of need programs were mandated, but the mere possibility that a state would
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ii. The Non-Price Competition Among Facilities
Congress also believed that health care facilities were not only un-
daunted from making unnecessary construction and capital expendi-
tures, but were actually encouraged to construct and expend by the
pressures of non-price competition.9 Hospitals cannot compete for
patients or doctors based on price, so they compete for doctors and
patients based on quality.91 To most, competition based on quality
would seem to be an acceptable behavior.9 2 To proponents of CON,
however, competition based on quality is socially undesirable.
Health care consumers, providers, and hospitals agree that quality
means having the biggest, most elaborate, most modern facilities and
equipment. "While health care regulators seek to rationalize the
health care system, health care consumers want to feel that when fam-
ily members fall ill, they will have convenient access to the best and
most technologically advanced medical care." 93 Patients want to be
treated by hospitals using the latest and best technology and proce-
dures, even if they do not "need" these facilities in the eyes of indus-
try regulators.9
Hospitals have four reasons for wanting the best facilities and
equipment: a concern for patients, a desire to attract new patients, a
desire to attract the best physicians, and a desire "not to be regarded
as a second-class institution." 9 1 The concern for patients is both altru-
istic and advantage6us.9 The desire to attract new patients is a neces-
sity for the profitable operation of any health care facility. 97 The
sacrifice all federal health care development funding was enough to avoid labeling certificate of
need laws as compulsory. See North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532
(E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978) (holding that the National Health Planning
Resource and Development Act was not unconstitutional because the Act's requirements were
optional and not compulsory).
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 300m-2(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1975), repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-660, §
70(a), 100 Stat 3799 (1986) (prompting states to establish and operate their own certificate of
need laws). States were given four years to create a program that complied with the Act. Id. §
300m(d).
90. See, e.g., Campbell-Eaton, supra note 22, at 1459; Roberta M. Roos, Comment, Certif-
icate of Need for Health Care Facilities: A Time for Re-examination, 7 PACE L. REV. 491, 529
(1987); Kaplan, supra note 43, at 483.
91. Campbell-Eaton, supra note 22, at 1459.
92. See generally ADAM SmrTH, 1 TME WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of
Chicago Press 1976) (1776) (describing the benefits of the "invisible hand" of the marketplace).
93. Roos, supra note 90, at 529.
94. Kaplan, supra note 43, at 483.
95. Id.
96. See infra note 100 (discussing the concerns over medical malpractice claims).
97. Even charitable and non-profit health care institutions feel the necessity to attract new
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desire to attract physicians stems from a concern for patient welfare
and a concern for the hospital's bottom line. 98 The desire "not to be
regarded as a second-class institution" is a product of human vice,
which some characterize as "institutional ego." 99 The four factors
combine to motivate hospitals to invest, invest, invest. Physicians fur-
ther fuel the hospitals' quest to invest by demanding the most modern
facilities and equipment.""'
iii. The Physician's Effect on Supply
A health care facility's financial risks from excess capacity and
overinvestment are allegedly reduced because the primary decisions
concerning health care services are made by the physician and not the
ultimate health care consumer. 10' Doctors influence the amount of
"services" supplied to a hospital. For example, good evidence exists
that the number of surgeries performed is largely determined by the
number of physicians available-the more surgeons trained, the more
surgery patients supplied. 0 2 This phenomenon is not limited to sur-
geons, but extends to all medical professionals who potentially supply
patients to a hospital. For example, "if his schedule is light, it is easy
for Dr. Smith to tell Ms. Jones to come back every two weeks rather
than once a month."'' 3 The health care system removes the
"purchase" decisions from the "invisible hand" of the marketplace,
patients. "(Als historian Rosemary Stevens has shown convincingly, even the nation's so-called
not-for-profit hospitals have typically run their enterprises very much like businesses." Uwe E.
Reinhardt, Reforming the Health Care System: The Universal Dilemma, 19 AM. J.L. & MED.
21, 27 (citing Rosemary Stevens, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH: A HISTORY OF TILE AMERICAN
HOSPrrTL N THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 359-61 (1989)).
98. In the words of one commentator, "because physicians carry primary responsibility for
making treatment decisions, health care providers find themselves competing directly for doc-
tors. " Campbell-Eaton, supra note 22, at 1459.
99. Kaplan, supra note 43, at 483.
100. In recent years, technology and facilities have meant more than quality to a physician.
They protect physicians from medical malpractice claims. Id. ("Many physicians now refuse to
perform certain services without such advanced technology for fear that the new technology will
be deemed the legally required standard of care in a subsequent malpractice action."); see gener-
ally E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. REV.
1719 (1987) (discussing the proliferation of expensive technology and procedures); Barry R. Fur-
row, Medical Malpractice and Cost Containment: Tightening the Screws, 36 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 985 (1986) (discussing the difficulty in containing costs of technology).
101. HAVIGHURST, DEREGULATING FOR COMPETITION, supra note 69, at 55; Campbell-Eaton,
supra note 22, at 1458-59.
102. Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1158 n.56; John P. Bunker, Surgical
Manpower: A Comparison of Operations and Surgeons in the United States and in England and
Wales, 282 NEw ENG. J. MED. 135 (1970).
103. Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1158 n.56 (citing Feldstein, The Ris-
ing Price of Physicians' Services, 52 REv. OF EcoN. & STAT. 121 (1970)).
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and puts those decisions into the hands of the physician. 04 Physicians
have an economic incentive to "sell" their "product," and therefore
have a vested interest in generating supply. 05
iv. The "Roemer Effect" on Demand
Just as physicians can allegedly generate supply, hospitals allegedly
generate demand. "6 Statistics show that when more hospital beds are
available, more hospital beds will be filled. 07 Likewise, when more
physicians are available, more health care services will be used. 10 8 In
short, the effect of excess supply of health services is the "manufac-
ture" of demand.' 9 This effect-the "Roemer Effect"-is named af-
ter the individual who first noted the relationship."0
Hospitals widely accept the statistic that an empty bed costs the
hospital about two-thirds as much as an occupied one."' Applying
this realization, hospitals can assume that a bed should be used if the
value of hospitalization to the patient is at least one-third the total
cost to the hospital."2 Economics and social pressures give hospitals
the motive and opportunity to generate demand for services.
In sum, Congress adopted the second goal of CON-preventing un-
necessary duplication of health care costs-to combat four
104. Proponents of certificate of need probably believe that decisions should not be in the
hands of physicians, but in the hands of regulators. However well-meaning, regulators simply
cannot efficiently manage a complex marketplace. See George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland,
What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1, 11 (1962). Certificate
of need regulators focus on incremental change based on consensual processes and bargaining
rather than long-range planning. Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1215. No
matter how large a bureaucracy may grow, the bureaucracy "cannot effectively control the daily
detail of business operations." Stigler & Friedland, supra, at 12. A regulatory agency is incapa-
ble of forcing a complex marketplace to operate at a specific combination of output, price, and
control, yet this is exactly the goal of certificate of need agencies. Certificate of need agencies
cannot be in possession of all the relevant and necessary information possessed by the managers
of every health care facility. Cf. R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L.
& EcoN. 1, 18 (1959) (providing an analysis of the 1950s' communications marketplace that
seems equally applicable to the 1990s' health care marketplace).
105. See generally Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1158 n.56.
106. See id. at 1158-59.
107. "By letting it be known that higher occupancy is desired, the hospital can usually cause
a loosening of institutional utilization review and can encourage doctors both to opt for hospi-
talization in close cases and to prolong their patients' stays. Patients have little to say about such
decisions ...." Id. at 1158 (footnote omitted).
108. Id. at 1158.
109. But see id. at 1159 (noting that "[s]ome have argued that the new supply may be merely
a response to pre-existing but unmet demand, so that new utilization is not really 'manufac-
tured.' ").
110. Id. at 1159 n.57.
111. Id. at 1158 n.55 (citing MEDICAL WORLD NEWS, June 16, 1972, at 14).
112. Id.
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undesirable factors: the externalization of purchase costs, the non-
price competition between facilities, the physician's effect on supply,
and the "Roemer Effect" on demand. A closer analysis reveals that
each factor is undesirable because each leads to an increase in the na-
tion's health care costs. Therefore, Congress' second goal of CON is
only an extension of Congress's first goal-restraining skyrocketing
health care costs.
c. Achieving Equal Access to Quality Health Care at a Reasonable
Cost
Congress's third goal-achieving equal access to quality health care
at a reasonable cost-does not have a direct connection to restraining
costs. "' Cost concerns were the paramount reason for the 1974 Na-
tional Health Act's CON requirements, but the Act also intended
CON to help achieve equal access to health care. 1 4
However, CON was to be only one element in the equation creating
equal access to health care; the most significant element was the antic-
ipated passage of a national health insurance program." 5 Medicare,
Medicaid, and the expected national insurance program would ensure
universal access, and the role of CON laws was to control rising costs
before Congress passed a national health insurance plan. 116 Of course,
Congress never passed a national health insurance plan. 17 As a result,
Congress's third goal was not addressed with any practical applica-
tion, but was instead little more than lip service to a noble ambition.
Therefore, Congress's "three goals" were in fact just one: a goal of
reducing the nation's aggregate health care costs.
113. Note, however, that by the Congress's own language, restraining health care costs is the
top priority. The goal is not to achieve equal access to health care at any cost, but to achieve
equal access at a reasonable cost.
114. See S. REp. No. 93-1285, supra note 20, at 39 (expressing a concern over access to
health care).
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. The national health insurance plan fell to political pressures:
[Iln May 1978, [a Democratic senator] proposed a system of "health security
[involving] a comprehensive and uniform benefits package with each person having
one health insurance card and receiving the same level of care. The government would
have paid for the poor, disabled, elderly, and unemployed through a revised Medicare
program. Medicaid also would have been eliminated as unnecessary. The Carter Ad-
ministration rejected the [plan] because of fear that such an extensive health reform
package would have been detrimental to the Carter economic recovery plan.
James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform: The Policy Context, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 15, 15-
16(1994).
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2. Why Congress Abandoned Certificate of Need: The Legislative
Reality
Four years after the enactment of CON, Congress repealed its man-
date. "I Two interrelated concerns spurred the decision-the law failed
to reduce the nation's aggregate health care costs, and it was begin-
ning to produce detrimental effects in local communities.
Shortly after CON was mandated to the states, the nation's aggre-
gate health care costs reached an historic high. America's 1982 medi-
cal bill reached $332 billion, or 10.5 percent of the gross national
product." 9 "This marked the first time the cost of medical services
exceeded ten percent of the nation[']s total production.' '1 20 "In one
comparison of health care prices and expenses, it was shown that such
prices and expenses are actually higher in areas with CON regulations
than they are in areas without CON."'' In fact, national hospital care
expenditures increased from $52.4 billion when Congress enacted the
1974 National Health Act to an estimated $230.1 billion in 1989.122
Today, Americans are spending nearly a trillion dollars annually on
health care. 2 1 In searching the scholarly journals, one cannot find a
single article that asserts that CON laws succeed in lowering health
care costs. I2 CON "has elicited a remarkable evaluative consensus-
that it does not work."'12
CON, in addition to failing to decrease national health care ex-
penses, was having detrimental effects on the provision of health care
in local communities. The effect of CON on local communities was
perhaps best related to Congress by the words of Representative Row-
land of the Eighth District of Georgia. Representative Rowland recog-
nized that CON appeared to be a good idea in theory, yet in reality
118. See Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 701, 100 Stat. 3743, 3799 (1986) (repealing the Health Plan-
ning and Resource Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 300k to 300n-6 (1982)), amended by Health Planning and Resources Development
Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-79, §§ 1-129, 93 Stat. 592 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-
300t (1976 & Supp. V 1981))).
119. Campbell-Eaton, supra note 22, at 1451 (citing DEs MoiNas RacIsTaR, July 17, 1983, at
10A, col. 1).
120. Id.
121. Kaplan, supra note 43, at 487.
122. Id. at 487 n.102.
123. See Havighurst, Contract Failure in Health Care, supra note 1, at 47.
124. One author contends that the proper evaluative analysis is not whether certificate of
need succeeded in lowering the nation's health care costs, but whether it thwarted the rate of
increase in the nation's health care costs. See Kaplan, supra note 43, at 487. That author con-
cedes, however, that certificate of need is a failure even under his alternative analysis. Id.
125. Id. (quoting Lawrence D. Brown, Common Sense Meets Implementation: Certificate-
of-Need Regulation in the States, 8 J. HEALTH POL., PoL'Y & L. 480, 481 (1983)).
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failed to control health care costs and was often insensitive to commu-
nity needs. 26 In Representative Rowland's district:
The citizens of Putnam County are proud of their 20-year-old
community hospital. They built it with local funding, without using
any Federal Hill-Burton funds, and they still support it locally. They
are proud enough to have recently approved a 1-cent sales tax to
renovate the facility. They are not seeking an expansion. The
hospital has always had 50 beds, and that's what they propose to
maintain.
However, when Putnam County authorities went to the State
health planning agency for the required approval under the
certificate-of-need program this year, they ran into unexpected
trouble. The agency looked over the request for the locally funded
hospital improvements and decided to deny it-unless the hospital
eliminated ten beds. 127
Putnam County protested the agency's decision. 28 The county's
growth projections indicated that all fifty beds would eventually be
needed, even though the hospital was not currently utilizing all of its
beds. 29 Likewise, Putnam County's cost estimations indicated that the
decrease in beds would have no significant effect on health care
costs. 30 The decrease in beds "would, however, reduce the number of
nursing students who could be enrolled in the hospital's LPN program
at a time when the country has a critical shortage of nurses. And it
would be much more costly when the county has to add back those 10
beds.'" 3 '
Nevertheless, the state CON agency would not acknowledge the
long-term increase in cost caused by having "to add back those 10
beds," nor would the agency consider the long-term impact on the
nation's shortage of nurses which could be exacerbated by eliminating
Putnam County's ability to train licensed practicing nurses.'32 "Elimi-
nating the beds would, however, enable the State health planning
126. 134 CoNG. REc. H9455-01 (1988) ("At first glance, the idea [of certificate of need] may
have looked pretty good. In practice, however, the effect of certificate-of-need on health care
costs has been dubious, at best. And the program has certainly been insensitive in many in-
stances to the true needs of our communities.").
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. Id. ("In any event, there is no significant savings to be realized by eliminating the 10
beds. It's true Medicare helps pay for interest and depreciation on hospital construction, but a
10-bed cutback would have virtually no impact on health costs.").
131. Id.
132. See id.
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agency to get the number [of beds] more in line with . . . the [re-
gional] quota. .. [I]t's a classic case of a [bureaucracy] paying more
attention to numbers on a piece of paper than to reality.""' The real-
ity, according to Representative Rowland, was "the harmful impact
this would have on the community without doing anything significant
to cut costs.' 13 4 Representative Rowland did not blame the bureau-
crats for these ill effects, but rather blamed the CON laws that neces-
sitated such bureaucracy:
Although I believe the people at the State health planning agency are
sincere, I also recognize they are tied to a system that is often high-
handed and arrogant. Federal funding for certificate-of-need
programs was ended in 1987, and 12 States have now abandoned the
program altogether. It's now time to abolish it throughout the
Nation. If anyone wants to know why, just ask the people of
Putnam County.'3
C. The Perseverance of Certificate of Need
After repealing the 1974 National Health Act and its CON require-
ments, Congress did not "abolish [CON] throughout the Nation"' 36
as Representative Rowland urged. Congress only repealed the legisla-
tion mandating state CON laws.'1 7 States were free to continue regu-
lating health care facilities with CON even after Congress repealed its
mandate."38 Many states did. 139
One may question the wisdom of continuing any form of state regu-
lation that failed to produce its desired goal when implemented na-
tionwide.' 40 As the review of Congress's intent indicates, CON had
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 701, 100 Stat. 3743, 3799 (1986) (repealing the Health Plan-
ning and Resource Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 300k to 300n-6 (1982)), amended by Health Planning and Resources Development
Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-79, §§ 1-129, 93 Stat. 592 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-
300t (1976 & Supp. V 1981))).
138. See id.
139. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 14.
140. For legislators, wisdom can sometimes fall prey to lobbyists. For example, the Texas
Medical Association was instrumental in reinstating certificate of need laws after the Texas legis-
lature repealed the regulations. See Statelines-Texas: Certificate-of-Need Program Reinstituted,
1 AMERIcAN HEALTH LitE, June 16, 1992. In New Jersey, a coalition of twenty urban and teach-
ing hospitals demanded that certificate of need laws not be repealed, warning that deregulation
could force hospitals out of business, and stating that they were "concerned there is a push to a
deregulated environment." Statelines-New Jersey: Many Hospitals Fear Deregulation, I
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one goal-to save money. However, in those states which retained
their CON laws, the retention was often supported by new and crea-
tive justifications, many of which were unrelated to saving money.
Commentators, in their traditional role of explaining the reason be-
hind events, have set forth many justifications explaining why states
have kept the same old CON laws. 14' All these justifications, however,
are the crafty work of commentators, and not the motivation of state
legislatures. No state legislature has codified any of these new justifi-
cations as legislative intent. 142 These justifications should therefore
carry little weight in a proper analysis. 43
AMERICAN HEALTH LINE, Nov. 19, 1992. Likewise in Georgia, the Atlanta Health Care Alliance
says it has "supported the certificate-of-need law and health-planning regulations .... Duplica-
tive, unnecessary health-care services have been very costly to our members." Access, Quality,
Cost - Cost Containment: Regulation "Back into Vogue, " 1 AmERICAN HEALTH LINE, May 11,
1992. See also Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1216 (noting that "avoidance of
'duplication' is of course consistent with a cartel's preference for minimizing competition").
Hospital lobbyists demand the protection of certificate of need, because "business coalitions...
see planning as a way to control costs for their members." Access, Quality, Cost-Cost Con-
tainment: Regulation "Back into Vogue," 1 AMECAN HEALTH LINE, May 11, 1992 (quoting
James Kimmey, Dean of the School of Public Health at St. Louis University). Hospitals are
aware that, instead of controlling costs (or "revenue" as seen from the hospital's perspective),
certificate of need had the opposite effect. See supra part I.B.2. "Viewed in the light of possibil-
ities for more fundamental changes in the market for insurance and health services, certificate-
of-need laws may appear as conservative measures, designed to preserve the very institutions
[that] create the problems to which they are addressed." Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra
note 4, at 1156. Hospitals therefore fight to keep certificate of need alive.
141. See generally Kaplan, supra note 43; Campbell-Eaton, supra note 22; Makar, supra
note 46; Bruce Babbitt & Jonathan Rose, Building a Better Mousetrap: Health Care Reform and
the Arizona Program, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 243 (1986); Norman Daniels, Technology and Resource
Allocation: Old Problems in New Clothes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 225 (1991); Hall, supra note 2;
Schramm & Renn, supra note 17; John A. Robertson, Asking the "Woman Question" About
Health Care Reform, 3 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1994); David M. Frankford, Privatizing Health
Care: Economic Magic To Cure Legal Medicine, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1992). Examples of new
justifications for old certificate of need laws include curbing "excessive competition," solving a
"moral hazard," rectifying "inadequate information," and eliminating "inefficient incentives."
See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 43, at 479-84. The true reasons for retaining CON are far more
pragmatic. See supra note 140.
142. See supra note 14.
143. A proper analysis of certificate of need should focus on the benefits of a regulated bed
supply. After all, the purpose of certificate of need regulations is to control the size and growth
of the bed supply. See discussion supra parts ILA, II.B. Therefore, to evaluate certificate of
need laws properly, the effect of CON bed supply controls should be measured against the re-
sulting increase or decrease in health care prices.
Regulatory restraint on the growth of bed supply will result in somewhat higher prices than an
unregulated marketplace would produce no matter how well the health care industry is regulated.
Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1218. Certificate of need laws monitor only
certain kinds of hospital costs, and therefore "may merely divert inflationary pressures and
achieve no control." Id. In many instances, this diversion leads to a higher price for health care.
For example, imagine two hospitals, one regulated by certificate of need, the other unregulated.
Further imagine an unexpected increase in hospital wage costs. Id. (revealing that this type of
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Even though CON perseveres, the rationale supporting CON has
disappeared. The logic of CON was based on the health care market-
place as it existed in the 1950s through the early 1970s. Today's medi-
cal marketplace is significantly different. CON is predicated on a
medical marketplace dominated by third party fee-for-service agree-
ments. However, the modern medical marketplace is shifting away
from fee-for-service. The institutions who are the primary purchasers
of health care services are banding together with the aid of govern-
ments. 144
III. ORIGIN AND INTENT OF THE MANAGED COMPETITION HEALTH
CARE STRATEGY
A governmental system fostering alliances between health care pur-
chasers in order to manipulate the price of health care suppliers is
called a managed competition plan. 45 Under managed competition,
governments aid purchasers in negotiating the lowest price for health
care. 1" However, the effectiveness of a group of purchasers is greatly
lessened when they cannot negotiate against a single hospital, but
rather must negotiate with a legalized cartel of hospitals, as is the re-
sult under a CON system. The following section suggests that man-
aged competition is doomed to failure unless CON laws are repealed
or dramatically scaled back.
Many states are now grappling with the dilemma of meshing the
two health care strategies: managed competition and CON. Both
strategies, it seems, foster the same goals, but differ in the means used
event is rather common in the health care industry by stating that increases in hospital wages and
"other types of cost increases ... are equally likely to occur"). The unregulated hospital has the
opportunity to add beds and thereby allocate the increase in wage costs over a greater number of
patients, resulting in a smaller increase in health care cost per patient. See id. The regulated
hospital, however, cannot add beds because of certificate of need regulations. See id. (implying
that, when a hospital's bed supply is fixed, then its maximum revenue is fixed, even though
maximum costs are not). The regulated hospital must allocate the increased cost to a smaller
number of patients, resulting in a larger increase in health care costs per patient. In that case, a
hospital would face increased costs because certificate of need laws do not regulate wages, yet
the hospital would experience no increase in revenue because certificate of need has capped the
hospital's maximum revenue. Certificate of need, therefore, can prove rather costly to individual
patients.
144. See Hall, supra note 2, at 3.
145. See generally Jackson Hole Group, Managed Competition 11: A Proposal, 46 WASH. U.
J. URB. & CoNTEm'. L. 33 (1994) (proposing managed competition as an alternative to our
modern health care system); Hall, supra note 2 (describing how managed competition works);
FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN., Tin FLORIDA HEALTH SECURITY PLAN. HEALTHY
HoMEs 1994, 25-47 (1993) (on file with the State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administra-
tion, Publications Office) [hereinafter FLA. AHCA ATLAS] (describing the implementation of
managed competition in Florida).
146. Hall, supra note 2, at 1-5.
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to achieve these goals. Whereas CON attempts to control the market-
place by regulating supply, managed competition aspires to influence
prices by putting purchasers on an equal playing field with their or-
ganized adversaries.
Like CON laws which evolved from philanthropic activities sup-
ported by special interest groups,' 4 7 managed competition laws
evolved from the ideas of academicians and were adopted by special
interests.'41 Professor Alain Enthoven, of the Stanford University
Graduate School of Business, first devised managed competition as an
approach to health care reform in the late 1970s.' 4 9 The Enthoven
model was further refined by the Jackson Hole Group,""0 and has be-
come the leading model for a managed competition health care deliv-
ery system."'
The managed competition strategy proposes a scheme of private in-
surance plans presenting individuals with a range of enrollment op-
tions offered by companies which manage the selection process and
make individuals pay the difference in price among the insurance op-
tions chosen.152 Legislation'dictates what kinds of health plans will be
available, therefore creating uniform health care products from which
to choose. A separate government entity assumes the task of aggregat-
ing health care purchasers, and negotiates on their behalf with provid-
ers to purchase the necessary health care products at the lowest
possible price." 3 "Managed competition attempts to achieve universal
health insurance coverage and health care cost containment via a hy-
brid between the opposite extremes of a completely socialized system
of health insurance like Canada's, and a largely unregulated private
147. See supra part II.A. (describing the philanthropic origins and American Hospital Asso-
ciation support for certificate of need).
148. See FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 25-47. The Jackson Hole Group describes
itself as "an ad hoc and changing collection of health executives, leaders, and experts who have
been meeting over the last twenty years to discuss and address the most serious deficiencies of
the health care system." Jackson Hole Group, supra note 145, at 33. Jackson Hole has been
instrumental in advancing modern health care reform. See FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145,
at 25-26. Its 1993 president, Paul M. Ellwood, M.D., was an early advocate of pre-paid health
care and "was instrumental in developing the 1973 legislation on health maintenance organiza-
tions." Id.
149. Alain Enthoven, Consumer-Choice Health Plan: A National Health Insurance Proposal
Based on Regulated Competition in the Private Sector, 298 Naw ENO. J. MED. 650, 709 (1978).
This article was the first articulation of a managed competition health care plan. Hall, supra
note 2, at 1.
150. See supra note 148.
151. E.g., FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 25-54 (admittedly inspired by the Jackson
Hole model).
152. Hall, supra note 2, at 1.
153. Id.
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insurance market such as currently exists in the United States. 1 54 This
"hybrid" intends to be an enhancement of the existing market system
that will "preserve and improve the benefits of competition without
sacrificing the social objective[sl." 55
Managed competition, therefore, uses government regulators to ally
health care purchasers in order to negotiate better prices from health
care providers. 1 6 The classic structure of managed competition
combines government action in the form of health boards57 and
health alliances'58 with private free-market activity in the form of pri-
vate health plans. 59 The critical factor of managed competition is that
market forces, and not regulatory forces, determine the cost of health
care. 60 Government's role in the managed competition strategy is that
of organizer and motivator.
A. Governmental Health Boards and Alliances
Through governmental health boards, regulators would set broad
guidelines and enforcement standards' 6' and stimulate collaboration
among purchasers, patierts, and the government.'62 Governmental
health boards would achieve these goals by selecting the individual
health plans offered to health care consumers. 63 In essence, the health
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id. Managed competition's ability to advance many social objectives, such as access to
quality health care for the poorest Americans, is already being debated. See, e.g., Rand E. Ro-
senblatt, Equality, Entitlement, and National Health Care Reform: The Challenge of Managed
Competition and Managed Care, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 105 (1994).
156. See Hall, supra note 2, at 3.
157. A health care board is defined as "a government agency that oversees the entire process
and sets broad guidelines and enforcement standards." Hall, supra note 2, at 3. In the vernacu-
lar of the Jackson Hole Group's latest draft proposal, the health care board is called a "Health
Security Commission" (HSC) and is described as "The Referee." Jackson Hole Group, supra
note 145, at 36 (table 1).
158. Health alliances are defined as "private or governmental entities that oversee the selec-
tion process and premium collection at the local level." Hall, supra note 2, at 3. In the Jackson
Hole Group's latest language, health alliances are given the winsome name "HelPS" (an abbre-
viation for "Health Plan Stores") and are described as "sponsors." Jackson Hole Group, supra
note 145, at 36 (in Table 1). In the 1991 Jackson Hole draft, "HelPS" were called "HPPCs"
(for "Health Plan Purchasing Cooperatives") or "Health Alliances." Id.
159. "The health plans .. .are, in essence, private insurance companies, although their ac-
tual nature may vary widely .... Common examples are the familiar Health Maintenance Or-
ganization (HMO) and Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) forms of insurance . Hall,
supra note 2, at 4.
160. See Hall, supra note 2, at 4.
161. Id.
162. FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 26.
163. See Hall, supra note 2, at 3; FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 26-27.
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board would set broad policy, and implement that policy by regulat-
ing the forms of health insurance available in the marketplace.16'
Through health alliances, the government would attempt to em-
power the disadvantaged to become players in the free market for
health care. Alliances "would have the authority to set global bud-
gets, exclude health plans, and negotiate rates."'6 5 Alliances function
by amassing the purchasing power of a multitude of health care pur-
chasers, and negotiating on their behalf in order to demand the lowest
prices from providers. l 6 A governmental health alliance's goal is to
bring the purchasing power of larger businesses to the small business
community and to individuals. 167
B. Private Health Plans
Under managed competition, governmental health boards would
approve insurance plans that "employ financial incentives and man-
aged care techniques to deliver a more economical and efficient pack-
age of health care benefits.""16 Such plans would be offered by private
insurance companies. 69 Examples of acceptable plans are the Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider Organi-
zations (PPOs) offered by the leading health care insurers. 170
164. See Hall, supra note 2, at 3; FLA. AHCA ATLAs, supra note 145, at 26-27. The Jackson
Hole version of a governmental health board, the Health Security Commission (HSC), would
have an even more limited role:
The HSC would be an independent federal agency to guide, oversee, and facilitate a
transition to a new health system. HSC powers and responsibility would be explicitly
limited in legislation to ... [rlecommending a standard benefits package...
[r]ecommendling] measures to balance the health security budget ... [c]oordinating a
standardized data reporting system . .. [sletting standards ... [d]isseminating infor-
mation and making recommendations on risk adjustment.
Jackson Hole Group, supra note 145, at 36 (in Table 1).
165. FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 27. The Jackson Hole Group's 1994 managed
competition proposal would require a balanced health security budget. Jackson Hole Group,
supra note 145.
166. See Jackson Hole Group, supra note 145, at 36-37. In Florida, alliance membership is
voluntary. See FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 27. The Jackson Hole Group considered
and rejected voluntary membership in favor of mandatory membership, because
[e]xperience has shown . . . that the small group market is easily fragmented into
small, expensive groups that insurers avoid and small, low-cost groups that are easily
insured. Such risk selection, and the associated cost shifts, remains the central prob-
lem which purchasing pools are intended to overcome and which will not be addressed
by voluntary HelPS [Alliances].
Jackson Hole Group, supra note 145, at 30.
167. FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 24-28
168. Hall, supra note 2, at 4.
169. Id. However, an alliance that finds a given group is not afforded adequate access to
private insurance plans may offer Health Plan Purchasing Cooperatives (HPPCs)-government-
run insurance plans-to the disadvantaged group. See FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 26.
170. See Hall, supra note 2, at 4. Other possible examples include Independent Practice
BEYOND HEALTH CARE REFORM
An HMO is a type of managed care company that provides compre-
hensive health care coverage for a fixed price to a specific group.,7
HMOs negotiate discounted charges with health care providers, and
restrict members to using only that network of providers. 172 HMOs
typically refuse to pay for the medical bills of a member who does not
use a network provider. 7 1 In this way, HMOs greatly reduce the con-
sumer's cost of health care.1
74
A PPO is another type of managed care company, similar to an
HMO, providing comprehensive health care coverage to a specific
group.175 The primary difference between an HMO and a PPO is that
a PPO will allow members to see a doctor outside of its network of
physicians, but will not pay so much of the cost as it would if the
member saw one of the doctors in the network. 7 6 HMOs, PPOs, and
their hybrid forms 77 can be referred to generally as managed care
companies, all of which play a managerial role under a managed com-
petition health care plan.17 8
Managed care and managed competition are not synonymous.
79
Managed competition refers to the overall market structure, including
government involvement. 18 0 Managed care refers to a private
Associations (IPAs), Integrated Delivery Systems (IDSs), Exclusive Provider Organizations
(EPOs), and even fee-for-service or point-of-service (PUS) plans. Under the original managed
competition proposal of the Jackson Hole Group, no limit was placed on the type of health care
delivery organizations. See Jackson Hole Group, supra note 145, at 39. Under Jackson Hole's
1994 revised plan, restrictions would apply, so that consumer choice of providers could be
achieved. Id.
171. Confused by What This Alphabet Soup Means? Here's How To Tell the Difference
Between an HMO, PPO, EPO and Everything Else, DENVER Bus. J., Oct. 21, 1994 at 27C, *4,
available in WestLaw, TRD&IND-C database [hereinafter DENVER Bus. J. HEALTH CARE GLOS-
sAY]. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (1993); 42 C.F.R. § 417.407(b); FLA. STAT. § 641.19(7)
(1993); 1 HARVEY L. McCoRMcK, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID CLAMS AND PROCEDURES § 18-B
(1986).
172. DENVER Bus. J. HEALTH CARE GLOSSARY, supra note 171, at *4.
173. Id.
174. See generally Hall, supra note 2 (extolling the virtues of managed competition).
175. DENVER Bus. J. HEALTH CARE GLOSSARY, supra note 171, at *6.
176. Id.
177. Hybrid forms include "open-ended" HMOs, point-of-service (POS) plans, and Man-
agement Services Organizations (MSOs). Hall, supra note 2, at 4, 7.
178. Managed care companies provide cost control, marketing of network services, oversight
of receipts and patient distributions, and management of finance, facility, and personnel costs.
See Hall, supra note 2, at 7. The reader should note a dramatic difference between certificate of
need and managed competition-managed competition shifts most regulatory control from the
public to the private sector. Cf. discussion supra part II.B.
179. As my colleague Miles W. Hughes succinctly stated, health care alliances primarily dis-
tinguish managed competition from managed care.
180. See generally Jackson Hole Group, supra note 145 (proposing a system with a market
structure indirectly regulated via government involvement in purchasing, financing, and risk al-
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association of health care providers who collectively bargain for the
use of their services."8' The collective services of such providers are
referred to as integrated delivery systems. 82 These systems are more
than vertical integration and joint ventures-they cover a broad range
of services, including a full array of hospital and physician services in
both inpatient and outpatient settings.8 3 They may also include long-
term care facilities and specialized services such as mental health or
physical therapy. 14 The managed care company and integrated deliv-
ery systems are a new form of provider,'85 created in response to the
difficulty of individual providers to prosper in the new health care
marketplace.
Although managed competition appears promising, no hard evi-
dence unequivocally proves that managed competition is effective.8 6
"Managed competition is a controversial public policy that is still be-
ing debated, even as it is taking hold of the health care delivery sys-
tem." ' One United States Congressman has referred to managed
competition as a "fairy tale," while another likened it to the "Star
Wars" defense initiative. 8 Even the Congressional Budget Office de-
clared managed competition to be "untried."18 9 These concerns about
the viability of managed competition are not ill-founded, considering
the fact that no nation or state has yet fully implemented a managed
competition system.'19 Even the Jackson Hole Group admits that
managed competition proposals seem stymied by the inability to pre-
dict the economic consequences of their implementation. 91
location). Managed competition has been defined as a "concept of providing a comprehensive
range of services, from doctor visits to hospital care, using techniques . . . to keep a reign on
health-care costs and ensure that the care rendered is appropriate and necessary." DENVER BuS.
J. HEALTH CARE GLOSSARY, supra note 171, at *5.
181. See Hall, supra note 2, at 5.
182. Id. at 1-5.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 5.
185. Id.
186. See Hall, supra note 2, at 10-11.
187. Id. at 11.
188. Catherine T. Dunlay & Peter A. Pavarini, Managed Competition Theory as a Basis for
Health Care Reform, 27 AKRON L. REv. 141, 157 (1993) (attributing the "fairy tale" comment
to Representative Pete Stark, and the "Star Wars" comment to Representative Dan Rosten-
kowski).
189. Id.
190. Id. "[Egalitarian analysts doubt that a managed competition strategy can .. contain
costs . . . . Many factors support this view: a competitive system will involve high costs of ad-
ministration and profit, risk-selection will remain the most lucrative strategy, and egalitarian
values will be in permanent tension with profit-making." Rand E. Rosenblatt, Equality, Entitle-
ment, and National Health Care Reform: The Challenge of Managed Competition and Managed
Care, 60 BROOK. L. Rav. 105, 110-11 (1994).
191. See Jackson Hole Group, supra note 145.
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States are nonetheless wagering that managed competition will suc-
ceed,192 and commentators are predicting that the proliferation of
managed competition is inevitable.19 The following question is there-
fore appropriate: what role should CON laws play in a managed com-
petition state?
IV. WHY CERTIFICATE OF NEED Is NOT NEEDED
UNDER MANAGED COMPETITION
Unfortunately, in states implementing CON, managed competition
will fail. In the words of one commentator:
[With the proliferation of] certificate-of-need laws . an
unexpected consequence may follow-a severe restriction of
competition in the health care market. [CON laws are] cost-
containing only if the excluded providers would have relied on fee-
for-service, cost-based, retrospective reimbursement. Prepaid
medical group practices or Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs), however, operate under entirely different rate structures
and payment mechanisms . . .. [Rieducing [the HMOs'] ability to
enter the market or to expand may contribute to higher health care
costs. Where certificate-of-need laws limit resources effectively, the
owners of existing facilities are in a seller's market. They can charge
inflated prices for their facilities, making it impossible for the HMO
to develop or expand .... [C]ertificate-of-need laws will continue to
raise health care costs by restricting the entry of cost-effective
providers into the market.' 94"
This commentator is illustrating a stark reality of managed competi-
tion-it can succeed only if health care providers are forced to negoti-
ate lower consumer prices with health care alliances. 95 CON laws
shelter health care providers from the price-cutting demands of health
care alliances. 196 "Strength in numbers,"'' 97 the very reason why a
managed competition health care strategy is touted to succeed, would
192. Several state laws provide variations of the managed competition strategy, including
Florida's Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993, the State Health Insurance Program
of Hawaii, the HealthRight and Minnesota Care programs, Vermont's Health Care Act of 1992,
the Washington Health Services Act of 1993, and Oregon's Rationing Plan. Jackson Hole
Group, supra note 145, at 34.
193. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
194. Budetti, supra note 48, at 44-45.
195. See infra part [V.B.
196. See supra part II.A.
197. "[Managed competition] aims to make health care a safer bet. And its guided by a
concept any gambler could appreciate-strength in numbers." FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note
145, at 30 (quoting Stephen Smith, The Miami Herald).
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be thwarted by hospital cartels united under CON laws. If HMOs and
other managed care companies can be forced from the marketplace by
united hospitals, then managed competition will fail.
Instead of risking the failure of the managed competition health
care strategy, states should repeal CON laws. 19" Managed competition
serves as a "nail in the coffin" of CON by making obsolete the ra-
tionale and reasons for CON.'" Below, each of Congress's reasons for
promoting CON is addressed, and shown to be moot under a man-
aged competition health care strategy.
A. Managed Competition Market Incentives Can Adequately
Restrain Health Care Costs
Congress's first reason for promoting CON was to address a per-
ceived inability of the health care marketplace to adequately restrain
health care costs.20 However, a managed competition health care
marketplace would keep a keen eye on health care spending. For ex-
ample, many HMOs and managed care companies restrain health care
costs by using the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set
(HEDIS).201 HEDIS is used by HMOs as a performance measurement
to give a numerical answer to questions about how well a given health
plan serves its members. 20 2 Inefficient health plans are replaced by
more efficient plans.203
As well as monitoring HEDIS, managed care companies also moni-
tor "outcomes." 2° "Outcomes" are a measurement of the effective-
ness of medical treatments, judged against factors such as mortality
and cost. 2 5 By monitoring outcomes, managed care companies are
creating a health care marketplace which seeks to restrain health care
costs.
A third and vitally important feature of managed competition that
makes the marketplace more responsive to health care costs is man-
aged competition's abandonment of the third party fee-for-service sys-
tem. Whereas fee-for-service involves individualized payments for
each health care service,206 managed care companies negotiate service
198. See Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1207-15; see HAVIGHURST, DE-
REGULATING FOR COMPETITION, supra note 69.
199. See infra part IV.C.
200. See supra part I I.B.l.a.
201. See DENVER Bus. J. HEALTH CARE GLOSSARY, supra note 171, at *4.
202. Id.
203. See id.; Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1221.
204. See DENVER BUS. J. HEALTH CARE GLOSSARY, supra note 171, at *6.
205. Id.
206. See supra part 11.B.1.b.i.
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discounts in exchange for sending patient volume to providers. 2 7 The
result is the demise of traditional indemnity insurance, in which com-
panies pay whatever rate a health care provider may ask. 20 Instead,
health care providers receive a previously arranged maximum fee for
the service performed, and the health care consumer saves money.
Fourth and finally, managed competition gives government, in its
role of health care board and health care alliance, the ability to stack
the deck in favor of restraint on health care costs. Health care alli-
ances will have the authority to set global budgets,20° and thereby im-
pose self-restraint on providers who realize that a finite amount of
resources will be allocated to their reimbursement. A health care alli-
ance which perceives health care costs to be increasing at too great a
rate can thwart that trend by "tightening the money supply"210 and
decreasing the aggregate amount of revenue available to providers.
Should a given delivery system21 I not respond to an alliance's global
budget pressure or otherwise prove too costly, a health care board
would have the authority to eliminate the delivery system from the
options available to consumers.
B. Managed Competition Market Incentives Can Adequately
Prevent the Unnecessary Duplication of Health Resources
Congress's second reason for promoting CON was that health care
markets cannot adequately prevent the unnecessary duplication of
health resources. 212 Yet, integrated delivery systems and managed care
companies like HMOs have the ability to manage health care re-
sources. "HMO development is perhaps the most promising nonregu-
latory strategy for bringing the excessive use of health care resources
under effective control. 213
Hospitals which are allied with HMOs and other managed care
companies should be exempt from CON statutes. 214 Hospitals
controlled by managed care companies do not face the same incentives
207. DENVER Bus. J. HEALTH CARE GLOSSARY, supra note 171, at *3.
208. See id. at *4 (defining "indemnity insurance").
209. See supra part III.A.
210. In this way, a governmental health care board would be not unlike the Federal Reserve,
which imposes self-restraint on the growth of the national economy and national interest rates by
restricting or loosening the money supply at strategic times.
211. For example, a fee-for-service system, a PPO system, or the like.
212. See supra part II.B.l.b.
213. Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1225 (citing Ellwood et al., Health
Maintenance Strategy, 9 MED. CARE 291 (1971)). Accord Clark C. Havighurst, Health Mainte-
nance Organizations and the Market for Health Services, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 716
(1970).
214. See Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1207.
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for overexpansion that characterize fee-for-service hospitals. 21  Man-
aged care companies pay providers in advance, rather than retrospec-
tively on a cost-reimbursement basis, and thus have "every incentive
to conserve their resources and to seek efficiency. ' 21 6 Therefore, an-
other presumption of CON-the marketplace's failure to control the
unnecessary duplication of health care resources-is not valid under
managed competition.
California, Oregon, and Washington have recognized that hospitals
controlled by managed care companies should be exempt from CON
regulations thwarting facility construction.21 7 These states have taken
an important and necessary first step toward the success of managed
competition. By exempting managed care companies from CON laws,
these states recognize that managed competition eliminates the four
presumptions underlying the conclusion that the health care market-
place allows for the unnecessary duplication of health care re-
sources. 21 In the following discussion, the four presumptions-the
externalization of purchase costs,21 9 the non-price competition be-
tween facilities, 220 the physician's effect on supply,2 21 and the
"Roemer Effect" on demand 222-are demonstrated to be inapplicable
in a managed competition system.
1. No Externalization of Purchase Costs
Proponents of CON contend that the health care marketplace re-
sults in an externalization of purchase costs because fee-for-service in-
surers will reimburse for any provided health service.23 In other
words, a patient need not worry about health care costs, because "in-
surance will cover it. ' ' 224 If this externalization of purchase costs was
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1207-08.
217. Id. Oregon requires that consideration be given to "the needs of members, subscribers
and enrollees of institutions and health care plans which operate or support particular hospitals
for the purpose of rendering health care to such members, subscribers and enrollees." OR. REV.
STAT. § 441.095(k) (1994). Washington's certificate of need regulations contain a similar proviso.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 70.38.140(12) (1994). Similarly, California relaxes its facility construc-
tion regulations for HMOs, "emphasizing comprehensiveness and coordination of services, the
importance of innovation and alternatives, and the 'views' of groups of users on the need issue."
Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1209 (discussing 17 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §
40518 (1973)).
218. For a discussion of the four elements, see supra part II.B. lb.
219. See supra part II.B.l.b.i.
220. See supra part II.B. 1 .b.ii.
221. See supra part 1I.B. 1.b.iii.
222. See supra part 1I.B.l.b.iv.
223. See supra part 1I.B..b.i.
224. FLA. AHCA AnLAs, supra note 145, at 25.
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ever a reality,225 it ceases to be so under a managed competition health
care plan. Managed care companies and integrated delivery systems
negotiate fees well in advance of service, and often base those fees on
local averages obtained using diagnostic-related group formulas. 2 6
Diagnostic-related group formulas, or DRG formulas, are "classifica-
tion[s] developed by Medicare a decade ago to determine how much
the federal program will pay for inpatient care." 21 DRG formulas
provide health care providers with a fixed payment for treating pa-
tients, regardless of the provider's expense in providing the care.121
Thus, under managed competition, purchase costs are not external,
but rather internal.
The latest managed care proposal from the Jackson Hole Group, as
well as internalizing purchase costs via managed care companies, fur-
ther effects an internalization by requiring government to maintain a
balanced health care budget.2 9 The Jackson Hole Group notes that a
managed competition state needs to achieve a predictable and accepta-
ble level of health care spending, and proposes that the most effective
method of achieving this goal is to require that health expenditures
not grow faster than revenue. 20 As a result, governmental health alli-
ances would be unlikely to pay more for the same services simply so
that a provider can be repaid for unnecessary facilities or equipment.
The actual use of the facility or equipment would have to pay for
itself by attracting new patients or otherwise generating new revenue,
because an alliance constrained by a balanced budget would not likely
pay increased fees without gaining increased services in return.
2. Non-Price Competition Among Facilities Replaced by Price
and Quality Competition
Proponents of CON contend that it is absolutely necessary to pre-
vent non-price competition between health care providers.23" ' Under
managed competition, non-price competition is nearly eliminated by
the use of "gatekeepers. 2132 A gatekeeper is an entity employed by a
225. Proponents of certificate of need overestimated any "externalization of purchase costs"
because procedures were already in place to prevent such externalization. See supra part
II.B.I.b.i (discussing the section 1122 capital expenditure review provisions of the Social Security
Amendments of 1974).
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 1886 (1993); 42 C.F.R. 412.60 (1995).
227. DENVER Bus. J. HEALTH CARE GLOSSARY, supra note 171, at *3.
228. See id.
229. Jackson Hole Group, supra note 145, at 39-40.
230. Id.
231. Seesupra part I1.B.l.b.ii.
232. DENVER BUS. J. HEALTH CARE GLOSSARY, supra note 171, at *3.
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managed care company to ensure that patients do not unnecessarily
increase the cost of health care.233 For example, a gatekeeper may re-
quire that a patient first see a primary care physician23 4 before visiting
a more expensive specialist 235 or seeking tertiary care. 236 All patients
must first contact the managed care company's gatekeeper before
seeking non-emergency treatment. 2 7 A patient is thereby precluded
from visiting the biggest, most elaborate, most modern facilities when
such facilities are not medically necessary.
Furthermore, managed competition fosters sharp price competition
between health care providers. In fact, critics of managed competition
note that health care providers in a managed competition environment
can compete on few terms other than price.238 The design of managed
competition is singlemindedly structured to create price competition
among health care providers .239
Quality competition would indirectly arise in managed competition
under the guise of efficiency. Alliances and managed care companies,
in measuring outcomes, would be searching for the highest return on
their health care investment. Providers with poor outcomes would
cause a patient to need more health care services, which in turn would
increase the price paid to care for the patient. The increased price
would be noticed, and the services of the provider necessarily avoided
by alliances and managed care companies. As a result, although alli-
ances and managed care companies might not specifically search for
quality, their search for the best return on their health care dollar will
result in a preference for quality care.
3. Counteracting the Physician's Effect on Supply
The physicians' effect on supply, a concern of CON proponents, is
overcome in a managed competition state by the HMO's effect on
supply. 240 HMOs counteract a physician's ability to order excessive or
unnecessary medical treatment by implementing utilization review
233. Id.
234. "Primary care" describes the system of preventing patients from becoming seriously ill.
Id. at *7. Doctors in the fields of family practice, pediatrics, internal medicine, and general
practice are considered to be primary care physicians. Id.
235. See id. at *3.
236. Tertiary care is "[tlhe most specialized kind of health care, falling under the purview of
sub-specialists like neurosurgeons." Id. at *7.
237. See id.
238. E.g., Rosenblatt, supra note 155, at 110 ("Analysts have also challenged the core prem-
ise of market competition, which . .. asserts ... [that health care] decisions must be made by
an abstract 'economic man.' ").
239. See supra part III.A.
240. See Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1228.
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programs. 24' Utilization review requires a physician to seek prior ap-
proval from the HMO before commencing with non-emergency medi-
cal procedures, and allows a managed care company to "look back at
the care rendered to check whether [the care] was appropriate. ' 42
Managed competition also thwarts the physician's effect on supply
via capitation. Capitation is "[a] method of reimbursement, typically
used by health-maintenance organizations, in which health-care
providers receive a fixed payment for every patient regardless of how
much care individual patients need. ' 241 Capitation provides financial
disincentives for doctors and providers who would order too many
tests or too many patient visits. 24 Therefore, even a doctor with a
light schedule will not have the incentive to see his patients any more
than medically necessary.2 4
Typically, utilization review and capitation are methods used by
HMOs, but under managed competition, governmental health boards
would have the authority to design and mandate the use of integrated
delivery systems which incorporate utilization review and capitation.2 6
Should a given delivery system prove too costly, the health board can
redesign it to include utilization review and capitation. In short, man-
aged competition arms the health care consumer with a powerful
weapon to battle effectively a spendthrift physician.
4. Elimination of the "Roemer Effect" on Demand
A final component of the perceived need to control the unnecessary
duplication of health resources results from the "Roemer Effect"
view that the demand for medical services can be adversely controlled
and manipulated by health care providers. 247 Under managed competi-
tion, health care providers are thwarted from generating demand for
their services. Managed care companies require pre-admission
certification before a physician can admit a patient to the hospital. 248
Thus, only medically necessary admissions will be made, as the
241. See id.
242. DENVER Bus. J. HEALTH CARE GLossARY, supra note 171, at *8 (defining "utilization
review").
243. Jd. at* 1.
244. See id. "Risk sharing" is the term used to describe systems which put health care provi-
ders at some financial risk when providing medical care, such as under capitation. Id. at *7.
245. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (describing "Dr. Smith's" method of gener-
ating extra revenue).
246. See supra part III.A. (discussing an alliance's authority to choose what kind of health
care delivery systems will be available to consumers within the alliance's jurisdiction).
247. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
248. See DENVER Bus. J. HEALTH CARE GLOSSARY, supra note 171, at *6 (defining "pre-
admission certification").
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hospital's incentive to fill beds is counterbalanced by the managed
care company's desire to avoid paying for a filled bed.2 49
In addition, under a managed competition system with a balanced
health care budget requirement, such as that suggested by the Jackson
Hole Group, alliances would strongly resist any unnecessary cost.25 If
resistance is futile, governmental health boards can mandate the rede-
sign of delivery systems to incorporate sufficient deterrents to the
Roemer Effect.25 1
In sum, managed competition creates a health care marketplace
where adequate incentives exist to prevent the unnecessary duplication
of health care costs. Purchase costs are internalized. Competition is
based on price and quality. Physicians have little or no effect on sup-
ply and the "Roemer Effect" no longer affects demand.
C. Achieving Equal Access to Quality Health Care
at a Reasonable Cost
Managed competition also creates a health care marketplace with an
excellent chance of achieving equal access to quality health care at a
reasonable cost. CON laws state an intent to achieve equal access at
reasonable cost, but rarely include any action to implement that in-
tent.2 12 The managed competition health care model includes a clear
action plan to achieve equal access at reasonable cost. Via govern-
mental alliances, the disadvantaged can share in the purchasing power
of government agencies.2 13 These alliances have the single goal of
making private insurance more accessible and affordable to disadvan-
taged individuals through collective bargaining power. 2 4 No hard evi-
dence has yet proven that alliances will succeed, but even an unproven
plan such as that offered by managed competition is preferable to the
failed plan offered by CON.
V. A CASE STUDY: How FLORIDA'S CERTIFICATE OF NEED LAWS
OPERATE AND CONFLICT WITH MANAGED COMPETITION HEALTH CARE
REFORM
Florida provides a prime example of the conflict between CON and
managed competition. 25 In order to illustrate best the conflict, the
249. See Havighurst, Regulation by CON, supra note 4, at 1221-29.
250. See supra part IV.B. 1.
251. See supra part IV.B.3. Likely deterrents include procedures to assure that treatment is
medically necessary, such as pre-admission certification, utilization review, capitation, and the
like.
252. See supra part II.B.I.c.
253. FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 26.
254. See supra part III.A.
255. California provides another example. See FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 26.
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following discussion presents Florida's CON laws and Florida's inter-
pretation of managed competition. 26 The discussion then identifies
the Legislature's acknowledgement of the conflict between CON and
managed competition. 2 7
The origin of CON in Florida parallels other states' similar laws,
originating from local community efforts to allocate philanthropic
and federal funding.258 Florida's first CON laws were part of the
Health Facilities and Health Services Planning Act, passed just one
year before the effective date of the Congressional mandate.25 9
A. How the Certificate of Need Program Operates in Florida
Today: The Statutes and Rules
Florida's current CON statutes are known as the "Health Facility
and Services Development Act. "260 The statutes are supplemented by
agency-promulgated administrative codes. 21 The structure of the stat-
utes and rules still shows the influence of the 1974 National Health
Act 262
Under Florida law, anyone operating a hospital, nursing home, or
intermediate care facility without first obtaining a CON is guilty of a
256. See infra part V.A.
257. See infra part V.B.
258. See supra part II.A.
259. Health Facilities and Planning Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 381.493-.497 (1973); FLA. AHCA
ATLAS, supra note 145, at 189 ("Since 1973, Florida has regulated the market entry of health
facilities and services through its certificate of need (CON) program."). After Congress repealed
the law mandating state implementation of CON, Florida established a nearly identical CON
system. See 1982, Fla. Laws ch. 82-182; 1987, Fla. Laws ch. 87-92; 1991, Fla. Laws ch. 91-282.
260. FLA. STAT. §§ 408.031-.045 (1993).
261. FiA. ADMreN. CODE ANN. r. 59C (1994).
262. Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k to 300n-6
(1982)), amended by Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-79, §§ 1-129, 93 Stat. 592 (1979) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (1976 & Supp. V
1981)), repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 701, 100 Stat. 3743, 3799 (1986). This Act mandated
certificate of need laws in the states. See supra part II.B. In Florida, the agency originally
charged with implementing the certificate of need laws was the Bureau of Community Medical
Facilities and Planning. See 29 FLA. Jutr. 2D, Hospitals and Nursing Homes § 2 (1979); see, e.g.,
Page v. Capital Med. Ctr., Inc., 371 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (involving the Bureau of
Community Medical Facilities Planning in its role as issuer of certificates of need). The Bureau
was given vague guidelines with which to review certificate of need applications. See 29 FLA.
JUR. 2D, Hospitals and Nursing Homes § 2 n.5 (1979 & 1995 pocket part) (indicating that the
Bureau must follow § 381.494(6), but when that statute failed to yield a definitive determination
of need, the Bureau was required to "follow applicable federal, state and departmental rules and
regulations in administering the certificate-of-need program"). The Bureau did not decide which
certificate of need applications would be approved, but instead made recommendations for ap-
proval or denial to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. See 29 FLA. JUt. 2D,
Hospitals and Nursing Homes § 2 at 342 (1979 & 1995 pocket part).
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second degree misdemeanor. 263 Additionally, anyone operating with-
out a necessary CON can be fined up to $5,000 for every day the facil-
ity operates without the certificate.2 64 Thus, Florida health care
facilities are very aware of CON laws.
1. Determining Whether a Given Project Requires a Certificate of
Need
Before breaking ground for construction, offering a new service, or
purchasing medical equipment, a Florida health care facility should
first determine whether the new project or purchase will require a
CON .265 Certain projects are exempted from CON review .2  To deter-
mine whether a project or purchase is exempt, the safest and most
cost-effective method is to file a request for exemption 67 with Flori-
da's Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA or Agency).26
2. Securing a Certificate of Need
Projects requiring a CON in Florida include, but are not limited to,
new construction, 269 capital expenditures beyond a specified limit,2 70
263. Anyone undertaking a project subject to review under Florida Statutes sections 408.031
through 408.0455 without a valid certificate of need is guilty of a second-degree misdemeanor.
FLA. STAT. § 408.041 (1993). The second-degree misdemeanor is punishable as provided in Flor-
ida Statutes section 775.082 or section 775.083. Id.
264. See id. Florida's AHCA is rather particular about who operates Florida's health care
facilities. See, e.g., Brookwood-Jackson City Convalescent Ctr. v. Department of HRS, 591 So.
2d 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (denying a certificate of need to an applicant because the applicant
would be leasing the facility to an unrelated provider).
265. See FLA. STAT. § 408.041 (1993).
266. FLA. STAT. §§ 408.036(3), 408.043(1) (1993 & Supp. 1994).
267. The request should take the form of a letter from an authorized officer or attorney for
the health care facility, and should include documentation to substantiate the request. See FLA.
STAT. § 408.036(3) (1993); FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANr. r. 59C-1.005 (1994). Within thirty days of
receipt of the request, the Agency for Health Care Administration must determine whether the
proposed project is exempt from certificate of need review. FLA. STAT. § 408.036(3) (1993). The
Agency's decision will be mailed to the applicant and published in the Florida Administrative
Weekly. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 59C-1.005 (1994).
268. See id. Even if the project or expenditure is found to be exempt from state certificate of
need review, it is not necessarily exempt from capital expenditure review pursuant to section
1122 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-l(b)(3). In Palmetto General Hospital, Inc. v.
Department of HRS, 333 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), a "hybrid proceeding involving both
the federal and state governments under an agreement entered into between the State of Florida
and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare of the United States," id. at 532, Florida's
First District Court of Appeal held that "we cannot say that ... [exemption from Florida's
certificate of need laws) in any way controls the Secretary on the question of whether or not he
will approve federal participation in capital expenditures on petitioner's project without need
being shown for such construction." Id. at 533. For a discussion of the nearly identical proce-
dures of state certificate of need laws and federal section 1122 review, see supra part II.B.I.
269. FLA. ADusN. CODE ANN. r. 59C-1.004(1) (1994).
270. Id. at r. 59C-1.004(2).
BEYOND HEALTH CARE REFORM
conversion of one type of health care facility to another, 27' changes in
licensed bed capacity,2 72 establishment of a home health agency or
hospice, 271 establishment of inpatient institutional health services, 274
acquisition of a facility,275 acquisition of major medical equipment,2 76
exceeding the approved budget when constructing a facility, 277 estab-
lishment of tertiary health services,2 78 and a change in the number of
psychiatric or rehabilitation beds. 7 9 In order to obtain a CON, the
applicant must follow the administrative rules promulgated by the
Agency and involving local health councils. 2 0
a. Step One: Letter of Intent
The first step to securing a necessary CON is to file a letter of intent
with the Agency and with the local health council for the area in
which the project will be located. 21' "The letter of intent process has
become the major hurdle for an applicant to overcome .... ,,282 The
271. Id. at I. 59C-1.004(3).
272. Id. at r. 59C-1.004(4).
273. Id. at r. 59C-1.004(5).
274. Id. at r. 59C-1.004(6).
275. Id. at r. 59C-1.004(7).
276. Id. at r. 59C-1.004(8).
277. Id. at r. 59C-1.004(9).
278. Id. at r. 59C-1.004(10).
279. Id. at r. 59C- 1.004(11).
280. See Robert S. Cohen, Regulatory Agencies, FLORIDA ADMNIsTRATrtE PR.AcIcE § 7.23,
at 7-18 to 7-19 (4th ed. 1993) (a publication of the Florida Bar Continuing Legal Education
section). Local health councils play only a small role in certificate of need review.
The Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) issues certificates of
need. Local health councils develop district plans, advise the agency on health care
issues and resource allocations, promote public awareness of community health needs,
and collect data and conduct analyses and studies related to health care needs within
the district ... but they do not have the significant role in the approval of certificates
of need ....
Id. § 7.23, at 7-19.
281. FLA. STAT. § 408.039(2)(a) (1993); Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am. v. Depart-
ment of HRS, 463 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The Agency publishes a schedule of dead-
lines for each particular project category called a "batching cycle," and all letters of intent must
be submitted before the batching cycle deadline and the deadline's grace period expire. See FLA.
STAT. § 408.039(2) (1993) (deadline); FLA. AiDm. CODE ANN. r. 59C-l.008(l)(g) (1994) (grace
period); Id. at r. 59C-1.008(l)(a)l. The application will be rejected if either filing is neglected.
Id. at r. 59C-1.008(l). The applicant must also publish a "Notice of Filing" within 14 calendar
days of the batching cycle deadline. Id. at r. 59C-1.008(l)(i).
282. "Before preparing a letter of intent ... meetf- with the agency, if time permits .... "
Cohen, supra note 280, § 7.26, at 7-21; but see Martin Mem. Hosp. Ass'n v. Department of
HRS, 584 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (failure to use the precise language mandated by the
Agency in the applicant's letter of intent was not fatal). The author does not understand why the
filing of a letter of intent has become a major obstacle for those seeking a CON. The statutory
requirements are quite clear and the staff of the Agency can provide assistance.
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letter of intent must include the legal name, mailing address, and tele-
phone number of the applicant,2 3 a specific description of the pro-
ject, 284 proposed capital expenditures,15 the number of beds sought, 28 6
services to be provided,2 7 type of equipment and method of acquiring
that equipment, 288 subdistrict location to be served, 28 9 and a certified
copy of a resolution of the applicant's Board of Directors authorizing
the project. 90 No CON can be issued to an applicant that does not
properly file an adequate letter of intent.29' Even if the letter of intent
appears proper and passes initial scrutiny, a flawed letter of intent can
cause a winning applicant to lose his CON if challenged in an adminis-
trative proceeding.
b. Step Two: Filing of the CON Application
After properly filing a letter of intent, a CON application may be
submitted. The CON application must be filed with the Agency and
the local health council by the batching cycle deadline and must be
submitted in the proper form. 292 The required contents for the CON
application are enumerated by statute and rule.2 93 The practitioner
should review successful CON applications before drafting his own. 294
283. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 59C-1.008(l)(c)l (1994). The applicant must also identify
entities with controlling interests in the applicant. See id.
284. Id. at r. 59C-1.008(1)(a).
285. Id. at r. 59C-1.008(1)(c)3.
286. Id. at r. 59C-1.008(1)(c)4 (if applicable to the type of project proposed).
287. Id. at r. 59C-1.008(1)(c)5 (if applicable to the type of project proposed).
288. Id. at r. 59C-1.008(l)(c)6 (if applicable to the type of project proposed).
289. Id. at r. 59C-l.008(l)(c)7.
290. Id. at r. 59C-1.008(1)(e). The resolution must be an original and must include the cor-
porate seal. See id. Many other technical requirements apply. See id. at rr. 59C-1008(l)(e)l-
(1)(e)7; see also Humhosco, Inc. v. Department of HRS, 561 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
(denying a certificate of need because the applicant's letter of intent contained an audited finan-
cial statement of the applicant's subsidiary and not the applicant); but see South Broward Hosp.
Dist. v. Department of HRS, 14 F.A.L.R. 3163 (Dep't of HRS 1992) (accepting a Board resolu-
tion as complete even though the resolution contained an error with respect to the date).
291. See FLA. STAT. ch. 408 (1993).
292. FLA. STAT. § 408.039(3)(a) (1993) (describing the proper format); FLA. AIMIN . CODE
ANN. r, 59C-1.010(2)(b) (1994). See also Gulf Court Nursing Ctr. v. Department of HRS, 483
So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (holding that after an application is "deemed complete ... no
further application information ... will be accepted"). But see Health Care & Retirement Corp.
v. Department of HRS, 516 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (emphasizing that Gulf Court did
not address the amendment of an application upon exceptional circumstances or prohibit the
presentation of updated current information). Allowing updated and amended applications
would be in the public's best interest, considering the length of time needed to obtain success-
fully a certificate of need and the likelihood of changed circumstances during that time.
293. FLA. STAT. § 408.037 (1993); FLA. ArDm. CODE ANN. r. 59C-1.008(5) (1994).
294. Florida Administrative Code rule 59C-1.024 contains specific guidelines for public ac-
cess to certificate of need records:
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The wise practitioner also includes "letters, testimonials, resolutions,
and similar documents to bolster the presentation of [his] case." 2 9
If the Agency determines that the proposed project involves issues
of great public importance, then the Agency may hold a public hear-
ing.29 Otherwise, the Agency has sixty days2 1 to issue a State Agency
Action Report (SAAR) and Notice of Intent which will either grant
the CON in its entirety, grant a CON for a specific portion of the
project, or deny the CON. 29 The Agency must publish its proposed
decision in the Florida Administrative Weekly within fourteen days
after issuing the SAAR and Notice of Intent.299 Any "substantially
affected person," 3°0 within twenty-one days after publication, may re-
quest an administrative hearing by filing a petition with the Agency 01
and serving a copy of the petition on the successful applicant.se 2 Any
applicant denied a certificate of need in the same batching cycle has a
right to an administrative hearing if requested within twenty-one days
All applications for certificates of need and written material pertinent to any applica-
tion are on file with AHCA and are available to the public. The records librarian sets
appointments for review of any certificate of need applications and materials and cop-
ying services may be arranged for a nominal charge. AHCA is very accessible and will
assist members of the public in finding any materials related to letters of intent, appli-
cations, or other pertinent materials that have been filed with the agency.-
Cohen, supra note 280, § 7.27, at 7-22. The author can attest to the accessibility of AHCA's
public records and friendly, helpful assistance of the AHCA staff. Special thanks to Gloria Mo-
reno and Todd Henry, who supervise the AHCA's CON applicants' room and file room, and
who have spent countless hours helping the author research various certificates of need and other
files.
295. Id. Choose such documentation wisely. The Agency will consider only statutory criteria
in making its decision. See Florida Med. Ctr. v. Department of HRS, 463 So. 2d 380 (Fla. Ist
DCA 1985) (permitting only evidence relevant to statutory criteria); Department of HRS v.
Johnson & Johnson Home Health Care, Inc., 447 So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (requir-
ing "a balanced consideration of all the statutory criteria"); FLA. STAT. § 120.57(I)(b)(9) (Supp.
1994) (requiring the statutory criteria to be supported by competent, substantial evidence).
296. See FLA. STAT. § 408.039(3)(b) (1993) (hearings are held at the Agency's discretion).
Representatives from the local health council usually conduct the public hearing in the district
where the project is proposed to be located. Cohen, supra note 280. Dates and times for public
hearings are published in the Florida Administrative Weekly.
297. The 60-day clock starts ticking after the Agency determines all applications in a batch-
ing cycle are complete or rejected. See FLA. STAT. § 408.039(4) (1993).
298. Id. § 408.039(4)(b).
299. Id. § 408.039(4)(c).
300. This term is broadly defined in Florida Statutes section 408.039(5)(b) to include any
applicant in the same batching cycle whose application was denied so that the successful appli-
cant's proposal could be approved. Id. § 408.039(5)(b).
301. Id. § 408.039(5)(a). See Florida Dept. of Transp. v. J.W.C. Co., 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla.
1st DCA 1981) (requiring de novo review at administrative hearings); accord, Beverly Enter.-
Fla., Inc. v. Department of HRS, 573 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (requiring de novo review
at administrative hearings involving certificates of need).
302. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 59C-1.012 (1994).
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of the Agency's publication of its decision.3 3 Hearings are held in Tal-
lahassee, Florida unless a change in venue will facilitate the proceed-
ings.304
B. Florida's Managed Competition Laws
As the preceeding discussion illustrates, Florida's CON laws are
typical of those found in most states. Florida is atypical, however, in
its commitment to adopt a managed competition health care strategy.
Today in Florida, managed competition is slowly becoming a reality.
In 1993, Florida's legislature responded to the plight of 2.5 million
uninsured Floridians0 5 by making Florida the first state to adopt a
managed competition health care strategy.30 6 The enacting law is
dubbed the "Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993." ' 307 In
order to understand how certificate of need laws will conflict with
Florida's managed competition plan, a summary of Florida's man-
aged competition system is presented.30
1. Managed Competition As Implemented in Florida
It is the intent of the [Florida] Legislature that a structured health
care competition model, known as "managed competition," be
303. FLA. STAT. § 408.039(5)(a) (1993). See also Bio-Medical Applics. v. Department of
HRS, 370 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (applying the ruling of Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC,
326 U.S. 327 (1945), that the grant of one of two mutually exclusive applications for administra-
tive approval without a hearing on both deprives the losing applicant of due process of law);
accord, Sarasota Cty. Pub. Hosp. Bd. v. Department of HRS, 553 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2d DCA
1989). Failure properly to request the hearing within 21 days results in a waiver of the right to a
hearing. FLA. STAT. § 408.039(5)(a) (1993); Inverness Conval. Ctr. v. Department of HRS, 541
So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
304. See FLA. STAT. § 408.039(5)(b) (1993); TRAwicx, FLORIDA PRACTCE & PROCEDURE § 5-
2 (1995). A hearing officer will preside over a formal administrative hearing at the Division of
Administrative Hearings (DOAH) on Apalachee Parkway in Tallahassee, pursuant to section
120.57(1) of the Florida Statutes. See generally 1 FLA. JUR. 2D, Administrative Law (1979 and
1995 pocket part); cf. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(2) (Supp. 1994) (permitting an informal administra-
tive hearing before the Agency in certain circumstances). At the administrative hearing, the ap-
plicant always bears the burden of proof. NME Hosps. v. Department of HRS, 492 So. 2d 379
(Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The Florida Evidence code provides guidance, but is not binding. EHR-
HARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 103 (1995). The "rules of the game" at the administrative hearing
can be shockingly different from those at the courthouse, requiring the guidance of an attorney
well-versed in "administrative litigation."
305. FLA. STAT. § 408.90 (1993).
306. Sandra P. Greenblatt & Michael J. Cherniga, New Florida Health Reform Plan Is First
Large-Scale Test of Clinton's Managed Competition Theory, 10 no.6 HEALTHSPAN 7 (1993).
307. 1993, Fla. Laws ch. 93-129.
308. Few published works adequately describe Florida's statutory scheme of health care ad-
ministration. For the best discussions available, see Justice Miner's dissent in Albertson's, Inc. v.
Department of Prof. Reg., 20 Fla. L. Weekly (D)1603 (Fla. 1st DCA July 11, 1995) and FLA.
ACHA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 25-33.
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implemented .... The managed competition model will promote
the pooling of purchaser and consumer buying power; ensure
informed cost-conscious consumer choice of managed care plans;
reward providers for high-quality, economical care; increase access
to care for uninsured persons; and control the rate of health inflation
in health care costs. 309
This preamble to Florida's Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of
1993 is the guiding intent for Florida's Agency for Health Care Ad-
ministration, which is charged with implementing the rules and regula-
tions to create a managed competition health care marketplace in
Florida.310 The Agency calls Florida's new health care strategy "a vol-
untary, market-based managed competition model."',
a. Florida's Health Boards and Alliances
In the Florida model, Accountable Health Partnerships, or
AHPs,12 will perform the role of governmental alliances, 13 and Com-
munity Health Care Purchasing Alliances, or CHPAs, 3 4 will perform
the role of governmental health boards) 5 An AHP is defined as "an
organization that integrates health care providers and facilities and as-
sumes risk, in order to provide health care services. ' 31 6 A CHPA is
defined as a "state-chartered, nonprofit organization that provides
member-purchasing services and detailed information to its members
on comparative prices, usage, outcomes, quality, and enrollee satis-
faction with [AHPs]." 311
A CHPA, therefore, is a group purchasing mechanism.3"8 An AHP
is the entity that actually delivers health services to CHPA mem-
bers.319 AHPs may be created by health care providers, HMOs, or
health insurers, so long as licensing and competency requirements are
309. 1993 Florida Health Care and Insurance Reform Act, FLA. STAT. § 408.70(2) (1993).
310. See FLA. STAT. § 408.704 (1993).
311. FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 27.
312. Id. at 26.
313. See supra part III.A.; FLA. ADMIN. CoDE ANN. ch. 59D-2 (1995).
314. FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 27; FLA. STAT. §§ 408.701-.705 (1993) (establish-
ing CHPAs and defining their use). In Florida vernacular, this acronym is pronounced "chip-
ah."
315. See supra part III.A.; FLA. ADmmN. CODE ANN. ch. 59D-1 (1995).
316. FLA. STAT. § 408.701(1) (1993).
317. Id. § 408.701(6).
318. Accord, Albertson's, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at (D)1604 (Miner, J., dissenting). "Each
CHPA is co-terminus with one of the eleven health service planning districts" and is "designed
to insure access to high quality, affordable health care for all Floridians without regard to place
of residence and at the lowest possible cost." Id.
319. Id.
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met. 320 CHPA membership is voluntary, 2 ' but all CHPA members
must purchase their health care services from an approved AHP.
Florida's AHPs are required to use managed care procedures for
containing costs, including utilization management, 32 2 HEDIS-style
monitoring, 323 and monitoring of access, 32 grievances, 321 and out-
comes.3 2 6 AHPs must contract in advance with providers in order to
obtain health care services at the lowest price, because only the AHP
with the lowest, adequate response to a CHPAs request for proposal
will be awarded the right to provide health care to individuals residing
in the AHP's geographical area.327
b. Florida's Managed Competition Private Health Plans
Various managed care companies will perform the role of private
health plans,3 2 including Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs),
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), Exclusive Provider Organi-
zations (EPOs), and point-of-service plans.3 29 Florida will also offer
"pure indemnity plans," which are the equivalent of third party fee-
for-service insurance plans.1
30
c. Rough Beginnings: The Difficulty in Implementation, the
Likelihood of Failure, and the Questionable Constitutionality of
Florida's Managed Competition
Implementing managed competition in Florida is proving to be a
slow process. During the 1994 legislative session, only one managed
care bill became law.33' Likewise, the 1995 regular session passed only
one managed care bill, and the passage of additional managed care
bills in a special session appears doubtful.
Some predict that Florida's managed competition, as currently be-
ing implemented, is doomed to failure.3 2 The characteristic cited by
320. See FLA. STAT. § 408.706(2) (Supp. 1994).
321. Id. § 408.702(6) (1993).
322. Id. § 408.706(2)(d) (Supp. 1994).
323. Id. § 408.706(2)(e).
324. Id. § 408.706(2)(g).
325. Id. § 408.706(2)(h).
326. Id. § 408.706(2)(i).
327. FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 32-33.
328. See supra part 1II.A.
329. FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 27.
330. See id.; See also discussion supra part II.B. 1.b.i (defining fee-for-service and identifying
associated problems).
331. 1994, Fla. Laws ch. 94-96.
332. See FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 28-30. AHCA identifies "the theorists" at
the Jackson Hole Group as among those predicting failure. Id. at 29; see also supra note 145 and
accompanying text (identifying the Jackson Hole Group).
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those who predict failure is that Florida will not require small employ-
ers to purchase coverage through the CHPAs and will not require that
employers or individuals purchase health insurance.333 Due to this
characteristic, Florida's CHPAs "cannot bear any risk or make ad-
justments to compensate for risk between plans."33 4
The Legislature, as well as finding difficulty in passing managed
competition laws, may also encounter difficulty in drafting managed
competition laws that withstand constitutional attack. In A lbertson's,
Inc. v. Department of Professional Regulation,3"' the District Court
of Appeal affirmed the trial court's determination that part of the
Florida Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993 violates the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.3 36 The unconsti-
tutional provision337 of the Act involved the legislation's attempt to
allow Florida small business pharmacies, or "independent" pharma-
cies, to sell prescriptions to CHPA members even though the "inde-
pendent" pharmacies were not affiliated with an approved AHP.338
This "independent" exception was intended to benefit only the small-
est of small businesses, and therefore did not apply to businesses own-
ing more than twelve Florida pharmacies or owning any non-Florida
pharmacies.3 9 The exclusion of non-Florida pharmacies was found on
its face to place an impermissible burden on interstate commerce, but
the exclusion of businesses owning more than twelve Florida pharma-
cies was facially upheld. 40
Albertson's illustrates the difficulty of implementing managed com-
petition on a state rather than national level. Managed competition
attempts to lower health care costs by affecting who enters the mar-
ketplace and on what terms.3 41 State managed competition laws will
333. FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 27-28.
334. Id. at 29.
335. 20 Fla. L. Weekly (D) 1603 (Fla. 1st DCA July 11, 1995).
336. Id.
337. FLA. STAT. § 408.706(10) (1993).
338. Albertson 's, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at (D)1603.
339. Id. The "independent" exception was limited by defining "independent pharmacy" to
mean
a pharmacy facility which is not part of a group of affiliated pharmacy facilities which
are under common ownership directly or indirectly in which the group has greater
than 12 pharmacy facilities in the state or has directly or indirectly any interest in any
facilities licensed under another state's laws for the purpose of providing prescribed
medicine services ....
FLA. STAT. § 408.706(10) (1993) (emphasis added). The emphasized portion was stricken as viola-
tive of the federal Commerce Clause.
340. 20 Fla. L. Weekly at (D)1603. "Plaintiffs present a facial attack . . . only. Plaintiffs do
not allege that section 408.706(10) is unconstitutional as applied ... Id.
341. See supra part IV.
19951
184 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 23:141
therefore inevitably have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Albertson's is an elementary case foreshadowing more difficult cases
in which state-managed competition laws will be alleged to be uncon-
stitutional as applied to a given plaintiff. In those future cases, a
state's managed competition law will survive only if the law is nar-
rowly drawn to cause only an incidental effect on interstate com-
merce.3 42 The theory of managed competition, however, is not
narrowly drawn. The more areas of commerce that managed competi-
tion can affect, the more effective managed competition becomes. Al-
bertson's suggests that, although state legislatures can proceed far
down the path toward managed competition, federal legislation may
ultimately be needed in order to enact completely the managed compe-
tition system.
2. Florida's Certificate of Need Statutes Cannot Co-Exist with
Managed Competition
The Florida Legislature faces delays and problems in implementing
managed competition, but has nevertheless succeeded in implementing
more managed competition reform than any other state legislature.3 43
However, gravely looming on Florida's horizon is the problem of
managed competition's conflict with Florida's CON laws. As Flori-
da's Agency for Health Care Administration grudgingly acknowl-
edges, the goals of managed competition in Florida are
indistinguishable from the goals of CON:
It was not until 1993, however, when the Legislature passed the
Ffealth Care and Insurance Reform Act that a major issue about the
continuation of the CON program emerged. The managed
competition model adopted by the 1993 Legislature is intended to
accomplish many of the same objectives as the CON program. 3"
The Agency is correct in stating that Florida's managed competition
model is intended to accomplish the same goals as CON. For example,
managed competition is designed to "control the rate of inflation in
health care costs, 3 45 while CON is designed to "[elvaluate the avail-
ability of more cost-effective service alternatives" and "[p]revent
342. See 20 Fla. L. Weekly at (D)1604 (citing Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27,
37 (1980) and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
343. See generally Greenblatt & Cherniga, supra note 306 (describing how Florida leads the
nation in managed competition reform); FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145 (indicating how few
states have implemented managed competition).
344. FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 189.
345. FLA. STAT. § 408.70(2) (1993).
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unnecessary hospital capital expenditures." 34 Managed competition
will "reward providers for high-quality, economical care, ' 34 7 while
CON will "[s]elect providers with a proven quality of care record. ' 3 4
Managed competition should "increase access to care for uninsured
persons,13 49 while CON should "[p]rovide access by predicating CON
approval on serving indigent and other underserved persons." 5 0 Flori-
da's managed competition laws, therefore, will be designed to achieve
the same goals as Florida's CON laws. The only difference will be in
the means to the end,"' and, as history has proven, the means chosen
by CON laws are ineffective.
3 2
a. Florida Has No Need for Certificates of Need Under Managed
Competition
The Florida Legislature must do more than merely note the Agen-
cy's acknowledgment that CON and managed competition have the
same goals. The Legislature must recognize that CON is unnecessary
under managed competition, and that the reasons and rationale justi-
fying CON no longer exist. 53
CHPAs create market incentives to restrain health care costs ade-
quately by acting as powerful purchasers who have the market clout
to demand lower prices. CHPAs can achieve this effect by choosing
AHPs via requests for proposals.1 4 The request for proposal is a for-
mal method for soliciting bids from AHPs which contain detailed fi-
nancial and service statements and allow CHPAs to evaluate AHPs on
equal terms. 55 To win a bid, an AHP must cut costs at every possible
level, while still proving its ability to provide the necessary care to
CHPA members.35 6 The CHPA therefore creates the incentive to re-
strain health care costs.
346. FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 189 (identifying "Certificate of Need Program
Objectives").
347. FLA. STAT. § 408.70(2) (1993).
348. FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 189.
349. FLA. STAT. § 408.70(2) (1993).
350. FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 189.
351. Managed competition laws will act by means of "promot[ing] the pooling of purchaser
and consumer buying power [and ensuring] informed cost conscious consumer choice of man-
aged care plans." FLA. STAT. § 408.70(2) (1993). Certificate of need laws act by means of
"[e]valuat[ing] the impact of new providers on existing providers" and "[a]void[ing] duplication
of expensive health care services." FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 189.
352. See supra part II.B.2.
353. See supra part IV.
354. See FLA. AHCA ATLAS, supra note 145, at 33-34 (discussing requests for proposals).
355. Id. at 33; see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 59C (1994).
356. See generally FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 59D (1994) (awarding the bid to the best bid-
der).
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AHPs also restrain health care costs. By statute, the AHP is re-
quired to use HEDIS-style monitoring, utilization management, and
other cost-containment methods prevalent in the managed care com-
panies. 57 By necessity, the AHP will seek to use prospective payment
plans, so that a given service will cost only a maximum amount. 58 The
AHP will use the best characteristics of managed care companies to
obtain the lowest-priced health care.
b. Florida's Certificate of Need Laws Threaten the Success of
Managed Competition
CON is therefore unnecessary under managed competition as imple-
mented in Florida. More importantly, the perpetuation of CON
threatens the success of managed competition.35 9 One essential element
of managed competition is competition. CON thwarts competition by
legally excluding competitors. 316
Another essential element of Florida's managed competition system
is the CHPA.161 CON laws shelter the owners of a CON from the
price-cutting demands of a CHPA. The CHPA must provide all nec-
essary health care to CHPA members in its geographic area362 and, if
a CON allows only a select few health care facilities to serve that geo-
graphic area, then the CHPA will have to contract with those CON
owners regardless of the price. Without CON, new providers could
emerge to serve the CHPA's target population at a lower price than
established providers.3 61 With CON, no new providers can emerge,
leaving the CHPA forced to purchase from the established provi-
ders. 64 A CHPA's purpose-to negotiate for the lowest-priced health
care services-is impossible when CON laws are allowed to restrict the
entry of providers into the marketplace.
Yet another essential element of Florida's managed competition sys-
tem is the AHP.165 CON laws limit the options available when creating
an AHP. The AHP which wins the right to provide service to CHPA
members is the cheapest AHP able to perform the task adequately and
competently. 366 In order to perform adequately and competently, the
357. See supra notes 322-26.
358. See supra part III.
359. See supra part IV.
360. See Budetti, supra note 48, at 44.
361. See supra part V.B.1.a.
362. See supra part V.B.1.a.
363. See supra part IV.
364. See supra part IV.
365. See supra part V.B.I.a.
366. See supra part V.B.I.a.
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AHP must provide facilities and services for every possible health care
need.3 67 Therefore, the AHP will inevitably find itself negotiating for
services which are regulated by CON. In those service areas, freedom
of choice is gone: a bureaucratic system has already selected which
provider will be permitted to serve a given area. The AHP does not
get to select among many providers and therefore demand the lowest
price. The role of the AHP-to select the most able and cost-effective
health care provider-has been usurped by the bureaucratic CON
process.
Florida's managed competition system is threatened by CON. Com-
petition is the antithesis of a CON marketplace. A CHPA's role as
negotiator is impossible if CON limits the number of market entrants
with which to negotiate. An AHP's role of selecting the most able and
cost-effective provider is commandeered by the CON process. The
Florida Legislature must repeal CON to ensure the success of the
managed competition reforms.
3. The Difficult Task of Repealing Florida's Certificate of Need
Laws
Repealing CON in Florida is more easily said than done. 368 This
year's attempt to repeal CON evidences that fact.
During the Florida Legislature's 1995 regular session, the Senate
Committee on Health Care sponsored a bill to repeal CON.369 The
Committee's goal in eliminating all CON regulation was to hear from
all affected groups and to keep only the CON regulations found to be
absolutely essential. 70 Apparently the affected groups did not like the
idea of repealing CON, because the Committee's bill was replaced by
a committee substitute 7' which only "removes certain health care pro-
jects from the certificate-of-need review requirements .... "372 Even
this bill was replaced by a second committee substitute3 73 that only
"modifies certain licensure requirements applicable to hospitals and
367. See supra part V.B. .a.
368. The author thanks Wanda Carter, Legislative Analyst for the Florida Senate Committee
on Health Care, for providing valuable research assistance regarding the 1995 attempt to repeal
CON.
369. Fla. S. Comm. on Health Care, PCB 1780 (filed March 9, 1995); see also Fla. S.
Comm. on Health Care, PCB 1780 (1995) Staff Analysis I (March 9, 1995) (on file with comm.).
370. Interview with Wanda Carter, Legislative Analyst for the Fla. S. Comm. on Health
Care, in Tallahassee, Fla. (July 28, 1995).
371. Fla. S. Comm. on Health Care, PCS/SB 1780 (filed March 27, 1995).
372. Fla. S. Comm. on Health Care, PCS/SB 1780 (1995) Staff Analysis 1 (March 27, 1995)
(on file with comm.).
373. Fla. S. Comm. on Health Care, Revised PCS/SB 1780 (filed April 24, 1995).
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ambulatory surgical centers . . . . 74 The final bill that passed the
Committee made no mention of repealing CON.3" On May 11, 1995,
the bill died in the Ways and Means Committee.
The Senator or Representative who next proposes to repeal CON
will evidently face an uphill battle. However, as CON begins to affect
managed competition reforms adversely, the uphill battle may eventu-
ally be won.
VI. CONCLUSION
CON laws evolved from the health care reforms of the 1940s and
were heavily promoted well into the 1970s by health care providers,
who found CON effective in sheltering their businesses from the
costly effects of a competitive marketplace. Congress mandated CON
in 1974, but quickly repealed the mandate when CON failed to lower
the nation's health care costs. Nevertheless, CON persists in thirty-
eight states, including Florida. These states are finding that the rea-
sons and rationale justifying CON no longer exist under a managed
competition health care strategy. Managed competition creates market
incentives to restrain health care costs adequately by promoting a
managerial role for managed care companies. Managed competition
creates adequate incentives to prevent the unnecessary duplication of
health care costs because purchase costs are internalized, competition
is based on price and quality, physicians have little or no effect on
supply, and the "Roemer Effect" no longer affects demand. Managed
competition even fosters equal access to health care at a reasonable
cost by providing governmental alliances with the power to negotiate
on behalf of the disadvantaged.
CON has historically failed to control health care costs, yet the new
managed competition model is likely to succeed. However, the perpet-
uation of CON threatens the success of managed competition. States
should therefore repeal their outdated CON laws when implementing
the managed competition health care strategy. Out with the old health
care reforms; in with the new.
374. Fla. S. Comm. on Health Care, Revised PCS/SB 1780 (1995) Staff Analysis 1 (April 24,
1995) (on file with comm.).
375. See Fla. SB 1780 (1995).
